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PANEL III:  Trade Secrets and Other 
Avenues for Protection of 
Advanced Technology 
Moderator:  Hugh C. Hansen 
Panelists:  Roger Milgrim 
 George Graff 
 Sharon K. Sandeen 
Closing  
Remarks:         Sonia Katyal***** 
 
MS. GIPP: 
Good afternoon, everyone.  My name is Michele Gipp, and I 
am the Managing Editor of the Fordham Intellectual Property, 
Media & Entertainment Law Journal. 
Again, I would like to thank everyone for joining us at our 
annual symposium as we celebrate our twentieth volume.  I would 
also like to welcome you to our third and final panel of the day, in 
which our panelists will be discussing other avenues of IP 
protection for advanced technology. 
On that note, I would like to thank our panelists for joining us 
today, and for taking time out of their busy schedules to come and 
speak to us at Fordham.  I would also like to introduce our 
moderator for this panel, Professor Hugh Hansen. 
 
A PDF version of this Transcript is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/ 
volumexx/book3.  Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive. 
   Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.    Partner, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP (retired).    Attorney, Arbitrator, and Mediator in Intellectual Property and Licensing. 
  Professor, Hamline University School of Law. 
***** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. 
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Professor Hansen is a Professor of Trademarks, Copyright, and 
European Union IP here at Fordham Law and is also the Founder 
and Director of Fordham’s Annual Conference on IP Law and 
Policy. 
I also know firsthand, as a student in his copyright class, that 
he has a great sense of humor.  So I am sure all of you will find 
this panel both interesting and entertaining.  Without further ado, I 
will turn it over to Professor Hansen. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Thank you very much, and congratulations to the IPLJ for 
putting on a great symposium. 
Okay, so this is going to be, I think, an interesting panel on 
alternative forms of protection.  And I think there will be some 
disagreement as to some of the issues, so it will be good to 
ventilate those issues. 
What we plan to do is to have our first two speakers speak, and 
then have some discussion of what they’ve said.  The third 
speaker, Professor Sandeen, will then give a speech which 
questions, to some degree, the scope that we should have for these 
various alternative forms of protection, and we will have a broader 
discussion on these themes.  So, I think it should be an interesting 
afternoon. 
Our first speaker, Roger Milgrim, I mean, he’s really Mr. Trade 
Secrets.  So when anyone thinks, literally, of trade secrets, they 
think of Roger Milgrim.  And if you think of anyone else, that’s 
probably trademark dilution, which we don’t want. 
But we’re very fortunate in having him come and join us.  He’s 
been practicing in this area for forty-five years.  His treatise is the 
best treatise by far and it’s been updated.1  It’s probably—who 
publishes the treatise? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
LexisNexis, Matthew Bender.  So they probably published—
they probably update it every other week. 
MR. GRAFF: 
 
 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS (2008). 
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It’s in its ninety-third edition. 
MR. HANSEN: 
Yes, ninety-third edition.  In any case, we’re very lucky to have 
Roger here.  Roger, the floor is yours. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Thank you.  When I hear Mr. Trade Secrets, it makes me think 
back to my first summer job.  I worked in Asbury Park and, on the 
boardwalk there, they had a huge Planters peanut sign.  They had 
Mr. Peanut.  I’ve now obtained that degree of recognition.  I’m 
very fortunate. 
Let me start out by pointing this out, the Bilski2 inventors went 
to the wrong lawyers, in my judgment.  They should have come to 
me or George.  We could have fashioned terrific protection that 
would have permitted them to commercialize their idea in advance.  
We wouldn’t have had these enormous and mounting litigation 
expenses.  More significantly, we would not have had to trouble 
the courts with these sorts of disputes.  I put to you that every new 
advance, every new advance, should be first tested against the 
available forms of IP.  The selection, of one or more, should be 
made in a way that optimizes protection for the developer, 
inventor, etc., and sometimes patent is the only game in town.  It 
certainly was not in Bilski. 
Now, I just want to point out what the trade secret in Bilski 
was—it was managing the consumption risk, costs of a commodity, 
sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price.3  So, it was a 
particular way of hedging. 
Since my theme is the desirability of picking and choosing the 
right form of IP, let me tell you why American lawyers are 
uniquely suited to doing that.  American lawyers are the only true 
international lawyers in the world.  Why is that? 
It’s because every time we have a contract, or litigation, the 
question of which law governs is always a subject of focus.  That’s 
 
 2 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski 
v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 
3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009). 
 3 Id. at 949.  
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because of our federal-state system.  There are differences, as I’ll 
point out, in the law of California, New York, New Jersey, etc.  So, 
we always have to think about the governing body of law.  The 
same applies for IP. 
Let me tell you what a trade secret is, so that you can decide if 
you’d like to have some of that.  There are basically two versions 
of the definition of a trade secret.  One definition goes back to 
1939—it’s in the Restatement (First) of Torts, section 757, 
comment b.4 
If you don’t mind, I would like to read that to you, because it’s 
really instructive.  It tells you virtually the entirety of trade secret 
law. 
I could stop at the end of this, and you’d have the benefit of my 
thoughts.  But, I have a few other random observations to make. 
“A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or 
compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and 
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it.”5 
Now, the way that the Restatement was structured, it gave 
some guidelines to help courts determine whether a matter fell 
within the category of trade secrets.  By the way, we’re going to 
get to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act6 (“UTSA”) in a couple of 
minutes, but these same guidelines that were enunciated in 1939 
are still used by the courts for purposes of guidelines for the 
UTSA. 
These are the things you want to know under the Restatement 
guidelines.  You want to know the extent to which the matter is 
known outside the claimant’s business.7  That tells you that trade 
secrecy does not require that there only be one claimant, but a 
relatively small number of people in an industry.8 
 
 4 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).  
 5 Id.  
 6 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). 
 7 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).  
 8 See id.  
C05_PANEL_3_FINAL_05-12-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2010  4:26 PM 
2010] TRADE SECRETS & OTHER AVENUES OF IP PROTECTION 879 
Second, you may want to know how broadly it is known in the 
business.9  If you tell every single employee in a large company 
the claimed trade secret, then that may go against you. 
You want to know the secrecy measures and that’s very 
important.10  That’s a key issue in the UTSA—the value of the 
information, the effort and the cost, and the ease or difficulty of 
others to duplicate it.11 
Now, the important thing about the Restatement definition is 
that it was designed to protect information used in one’s business 
that lends a competitive advantage.  Let’s spring forward to the 
UTSA, which was developed in the 1970s12 and it was adopted by 
various states, some 45 states,13 between say 1983 and 2007. 
The UTSA, which the drafters said really captures the common 
law, actually does not.  It goes beyond the common law in this 
sense.  Use in one’s business is, for purposes of the Act, not a 
requisite.14 
Let me read this because my memory never was good and it’s 
worse these days: “Information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process”15—
mind you, all of those things are described as information—“that 
derives independent economic value, actual or potential.”16 Actual 
or potential—so now the Uniform Act says that something doesn’t 
have to be proven to have a competitive advantage if it has a 
 
 9 Id.  
 10 Id.  
 11 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (defining a trade secret as 
“information . . . that derives independent economic value . . . from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons . . . and 
is the subject of efforts . . . to maintain its secrecy”). 
 12 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980). 
 13 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426 (West 2008); FLA. STAT. § 688.001 (2008); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-24-101 (2006).   
 14 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433 (“The definition of ‘trade 
secret’ contains a reasonable departure from the Restatement of Torts (First) definition 
which required that a trade secret be ‘continuously used in one’s business.’  The broader 
definition in the proposed Act extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an 
opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade secret to use.”). 
 15 Id. § 1(4). 
 16 Id. § 1(4)(i). 
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potential one.17  Also, the UTSA, as part of its definition, requires 
that the information be subject to reasonable secrecy safeguards.18 
I was fascinated by this morning’s panel discussing Bilski 
because the panel identified so many different possibilities about 
where the Bilski claims do or do not fit.19  Is it a process?  Is it a 
machine?  If you can’t get over that hurdle, if it doesn’t shoehorn 
into the Act, you have problems. 
Look at trade secrecy—“any information.”20  Isn’t that terrific?  
“Any”—as long as it has an actual or potential competitive 
advantage, not generally known in the trade or industry, and 
subject to reasonable safeguards.21 
So, let me just point out, by the way, before I leave this point, 
that the difference actually is that the UTSA has broadened trade 
secret law in those states where it’s in effect.  Because, previously, 
if you had an idea for a new product, you didn’t make it.  You 
went to Procter & Gamble and said, “I have this great idea for a 
soap.  We could call it Ivory.  It’s going to be a runaway winner.” 
You could not prevail under the Restatement definition of a 
trade secret because your idea had not been used in your trade or 
business lending a competitive advantage.22  You might have a 
contractual claim, but if you were suing on contract for submission 
of an idea, you had radically different standards in the two states 
that have most often adjudicated that issue. 
In New York, to have consideration, the idea had to be 
concrete, novel, and submitted pursuant to a specific agreement as 
to confidentiality.23 
 
 17 See id. § 1 cmt. (“The broader definition in the proposed Act extends protection to a 
plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade secret to 
use.”).  
 18 Id. § 1(4)(ii). 
 19 See generally Symposium, The Patent Landscape with Bilski on the Map, 20 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 715 (2010). 
 20 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).  
 21 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433. 
 22 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (defining trade secret as “information 
which is used in one’s business, and which gives him . . . an advantage over 
competitors”).  
 23 See McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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In California, all you had to prove was that you had submitted 
in confidence and that the idea proved to have value to the person 
that used it.24  So, the California idea-submission rule is very 
different from New York’s and that is very important to the movie 
industry, the radio industry, the television industry, etc. 
Now, I want to also steer you clear because we should be 
careful about the words we use.  The phrase “Uniform Act” 
implies that we’re all naive and innocent.  The word “uniform” 
conjures up for us a premise.  That is, where adopted, the Act is the 
same from place to place.  Well, that’s not the case. 
In fact, the Uniform Act is adopted by each state, and the states 
have adopted it in different ways.  The actual definitional 
phraseology differs.  I’m going to give you an example where my 
partner, my former partner, George Graff, and I conceived that the 
definition in Colorado looked very good to us for a particular 
purpose. 
I’d like to give you a quick example, however, of how broad 
information can be and the kinds of things that can be protected as 
a trade secret.  Let me take something that is intended to shock 
you, I know you don’t shock easy, but this may do it. 
What if I told you a method of cashing a check was a trade 
secret?  Would you think that I was bereft of my senses, if you 
don’t think that already?  Two federal courts,25 and one state 
court,26 have determined that the method of cashing a check was a 
trade secret and, in fact, by any standard it was. 
I’ll shorten my remarks on that type of case by telling you what 
the method permitted.  In the state of New York, by the way, I 
think that if you maintained a place of business more than a certain 
distance, I think it’s 1,000 yards, from a commercial bank, you’re 
obliged to offer your employees the option of a check or cash. 
 
 24 See, e.g., Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 533–34 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1982). 
 25 Please note that these cases were unreported and were used to illustrate the breadth 
of trade secret coverage. 
 26 Please note that this case was unreported and was used to illustrate the breadth of 
trade secret coverage.  
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So what all employers do, for example, IBM in Armonk, when 
there were no banks near it, they had to offer their employees 
checks and then be prepared to cash it for the employees who 
wanted cash.  The same goes for AT&T, when it was building big 
facilities there.  So, you could have a line of hundreds, and perhaps 
thousands, of employees waiting for cash. 
Now, I will tell you that typically in a bank transaction, for a 
check of $756.30, the average period of time to deliver the cash 
from the cashier to your hands is about two minutes.  That’s the 
average—that does not include identification, just the process of 
counting it and recounting it. 
Now, I will tell you that the method, that was found to be the 
trade secret, guaranteed delivery of the cash in ten seconds or less.  
And, actually, it was seven seconds, but that wasn’t the interesting 
part.  The cash came to the recipient with consecutive last number 
serial numbers. 
So, if you had thirty-five twenty dollar bills, and the last serial 
number was a six, and the next bill was a ten dollar bill, the last 
serial number would be seven.  And, if it went up to two, and then 
you got to one dollar bills, they would also have consecutive serial 
numbers—all in seven seconds.  So, you had both rapidity and an 
audit trail. 
That is a prime example of a trade secret—pure information. It 
was based on a very sophisticated algorithm for how the money 
was stacked, if you will.  And, no one before or since has 
duplicated it. 
So, let’s go to this definitional point that I raised.  I’ll tell you 
about—by the way, I don’t have any PowerPoint slides or 
anything.  But, the wonderful thing about trade secrets is that it’s 
fact intensive, and, therefore, it’s all little stories.  You put them all 
together.  They sort of form a pattern. 
So, let me tell you about an interesting story and it’s something 
that some of you may even have experienced yourselves. 
Back in the 1970s, what’s called GlaxoSmithKline today, 
discovered that a particular acid, excreted by a bacteria found in 
nature, when combined with another substance, created an 
exceptionally effective antibiotic.  In fact, the antibiotic that was 
C05_PANEL_3_FINAL_05-12-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2010  4:26 PM 
2010] TRADE SECRETS & OTHER AVENUES OF IP PROTECTION 883 
created became one of the world’s largest selling antibiotics under 
the trademark of Augmentin.27 
The problem was that nature, while giving us this wonderful 
substance for free, gave us puny bacteria that created it.  These 
were really feeble little guys that probably were smoking weed or 
something, but they weren’t doing their job. 
What happened is that Glaxo spent almost fifteen years 
breeding a superbug, with a little cape, flying faster than a 
speeding bullet.  It was a great bacteria that produced enormous 
amounts of the substance, and then Glaxo was able to 
commercially respond to a market. 
What happened is that an employee thought that the product 
was so good that he’d take a little bit of the dip from one of the 
vats.  And, while there’s some dispute as to how he took it, he 
claims he took it on the sole of his shoes.  We know that he took it 
and he then cultured it, and sold it to third world manufacturers 
who then produced an Augmentin-like antibiotic.28 
Glaxo was not happy about that event and they wanted to do 
something about it.  But, the question is how? 
Here you have a finished product on the market, which is in the 
form of a tablet.  It’s made from two constituent products plus 
other things, but one of the constituent products is found in nature.  
So, how do you prove that your bacteria, with its souped up 
DNA—which we will call information for these purposes—was 
involved in a competitive product?  And, the answer was, at least 
at the beginning, you couldn’t. 
That was the case because of requirements in litigation.  When 
you bring a proceeding, you have to have a foundation—a solid 
basis for making assertions, which is an obstacle that’s even higher 
in many countries than in our country.  There was no way to sue, 
but that didn’t entirely discourage Glaxo because it spent several 
years and many, many millions of dollars to develop a 
methodology—a test that would permit examining the finished 
 
 27 See Augmentin, http://antibiotics-online.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
 28 See Certain Coamoxiclav Prods., No. 337-TA-479, 2003 WL 1793272 (U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n Mar. 6, 2003). 
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product and discerning the DNA of the bacteria that created this 
one element.  It took years to do that. 
There were lawsuits.  Now, let me get, if I may, to some of the 
definitional issues that I think you’ll find interesting. 
We had a stroke of good luck in that particular case because 
there was a rather special UTSA in a jurisdiction in which the 
competitor distributed its product.  By the way, the competitor in 
this case was a company that had been acquired by another major 
pharmaceutical company, Novartis, and its distribution center, in 
the United States, was in Colorado. 
Well, for George Graff, that of course meant great skiing.  For 
me, it meant, I wonder how the Colorado Act defines trade secrets.  
I’m not a skier, you can tell by that. 
This is a good example of how the Uniform Act isn’t uniform, 
and how little nuances are very important. 
The definition of a trade secret in Colorado is “the whole or 
any portion or phase of any scientific or technical information, . . . 
process, . . . [or] improvement . . . which is secret and of value.”29  
I’m not sure that really says more than “any information.”  But, to 
George and me, it looked like Valhalla because it sounded so much 
like our little bacteria. 
Glaxo brought a trade secret action in Colorado.30  For good 
measure, we also brought an action in the International Trade 
Commission (“ITC”) to prohibit importation of the product.31  I’d 
like to tell you what the answer was in Colorado, but the action 
was stayed.  So, we have to jump into the ITC—the United States 
International Trade Commission. 
As you may know, section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is 
designed to prevent the importation of products, goods and 
products, which are manufactured, or result in unfair 
 
 29 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-102(4) (2006).  
 30 See Certain Coamoxiclav Prods., No. 337-TA-479, 2003 WL 21783061 (U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n July 11, 2003) (referencing GlaxoSmithKline’s parallel action brought in 
Colorado State Court). 
 31 Id. 
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competition.32 So, Glaxo sued there—in the ITC.  The 
administrative law judge, determining that the Restatement 
definition of trade secrets should apply, something that surprised, 
incidentally, both the plaintiffs and defendants, knocked the trade 
secret claim out on the grounds that there had not been a showing 
of adequate safeguards of the trade secrets.33  But, they did say, 
“look, you have other civil remedies.”34   
Glaxo appealed to the full commission and they reversed.35  
They reversed in a way that doesn’t really tell us what they thought 
about the trade secret.   
Remember, the bacteria is property.  Trade secrets are property, 
by the way.  The Supreme Court has said that,36 and virtually every 
court in the United States has said that37—although that’s a legal 
rule that many commentators, other than myself, seem to have 
difficulty with. 
But, the important thing to remember is that the administrative 
law judge’s ruling, in essence, actually suggests that the 
“information” in Glaxo’s superbug was a trade secret because he 
granted summary judgment to the defendants on the grounds that 
inadequate safeguards had been taken.38  That arguably establishes 
that they were susceptible of being a trade secret.  Therefore, a 
thing modified, whose DNA was modified, could be, itself, 
information, and as such, subject to trade secret protection. 
Now let me turn to Bilski.  These are the questions, had Bilski 
come to the right lawyer, that would have been asked. 
 
 32 See Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2006)). 
 33 See Certain Coamoxiclav Prods., 2003 WL 1793272 (dismissing trade secret claim 
on summary determination). 
 34 See id. (maintaining, in summary determination, that plaintiff must rely on contract 
law). 
 35 Certain Coamoxiclav Prods., 2003 WL 21783061.  
 36 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002–03 (1984). 
 37 See, e.g., Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2002); DTM 
Research L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Stafford, 727 F.2d 1043, 1052 (11th Cir. 1984).  
 38 See Certain Coamoxiclav Prods., 2003 WL 1793272. 
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Would the method, claimed by Bilski,39 had been protectable 
under any definition of a trade secret?  I’m sure we all agree, of 
course, that it was information.  It was a method consisting of 
information and techniques.  But, could it have been retained as a 
trade secret and commercially exploited?  We’re getting to the real 
money question.  Could it have been exploited while maintained as 
a trade secret? 
The answer to that is really equally easy.  And, the answer is 
“yes,” whether it had been maintained internally to operate the 
commodity hedging of an Archer Daniels Midland, or whether 
there had been a desire to license the information. 
Finally, are there advantages or disadvantages in comparison to 
patent protection?  That’s a very important question because 
business people in the real world want to know what their options 
are, and what the consequences of their options are. 
Thank you.  I’m going to be summarily executed in five 
minutes. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
No, actually, it may be not summarily.  It might be horrible. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Horrible, right.  I always take the optimistic view. 
So, the important question is, what kind of protection could 
you have internally?  Well, it’s really easy—the check 
cashing/money dispensing method.  The money dispensing method 
that I described a few minutes ago was maintained internally for 
fifteen years and it was the basis of a highly profitable business. 
There’d be no reason why a big hedge fund, or a commodities 
trader, couldn’t maintain this internally.  But, if the developer 
wished to exploit it outside of the enterprise, it is important to keep 
in mind that trade secrets are susceptible of licensing.  That’s very 
important. 
 
 39 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949–50 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub 
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-
964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009). 
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First of all, let me be fair.  The word “licensing,” when applied 
to trade secrets, is a misnomer because trade secrets provide no 
exclusionary or exclusive power.  Everybody’s at liberty to fairly 
develop a trade secret. 
Actually, one of the strengths in licensing a trade secret is the 
fact that it is not exclusionary.  And, when I say strength, you can 
do more in your contract because the right has less power.  Let me 
explain that very simply. 
Although the case is dead wrong, U.S. patent law, in Brulotte v. 
Thys, Inc.,40 says that you cannot “extract,”41 which means you 
cannot require. The Supreme Court sometimes uses colorful 
language, especially when it is not unduly familiar with what it’s 
talking about—royalty beyond the date of effectiveness of the 
patent.42 
First of all, Brulotte is a particularly abysmally reasoned 
decision.  Actually, logically, it’s completely wrong.  But, let’s 
assume it’s a good decision.  Now, let’s say, well, what about a 
trade secret?  Can you continue to get royalties once the secret 
expires? 
The answer is, since you had no exclusionary power, you had 
no power to exhaust or go beyond.  If the other side of the license 
deal will agree, if the other side wants to have the secret disclosed 
to it enough, you can bargain for that.43 
Considerations of time mandate that I wrap up. Let me do so 
with two points, which go to the efforts that are required of a trade 
secret owner to maintain protection. 
To get a patent is, to begin with, a formal administrative 
procedure, and it’s an expensive one.44  To get a trade secret, all 
you have to do is use information, or have something susceptible 
 
 40 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
 41 Id. at 33–34. 
 42 Id. at 33. 
 43 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264 (1979). 
 44 See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html#app (last visited Feb. 15, 
2010). 
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of use, and you have to have reasonable safeguards.45  So, trade 
secret protection is relatively easy to obtain. 
Now, I’d like to just explore, with you, the way we took the 
money example—counting money.  I’d like to ask you to consider 
whether the following safeguards would be adequate.  And, I took 
a little time to put this example together but let me try it from 
memory. 
Suppose there is a process manufacturing plant.  Suppose the 
plant practices a secret process.  Suppose the process is permitted 
to be viewed by visitors who don’t sign any confidentiality 
agreement, suppose further that the entire process is in a modern 
plant with lots of glass windows, and there are no restrictions that 
would prevent people from peering in.  Suppose none of the 
employees who work there sign confidentiality agreements.  How 
many people think that description deprives the matter of the trade 
secret, or deprives trade secrecy for inadequacy of safeguards? 
QUESTIONER: 
You can see all the details? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
You can see the entire process.  Could we have a show of 
hands for those people that think there is a trade secret here? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Yes, the secret is the process.  Okay, the answer is that I don’t 
know the answer to that one.  The reason I don’t know is because 
I’d need a lot more facts.  For example, what if the equipment used 
to practice the process is commercial equipment that’s been 
specially altered so that it does things that are unique.  Suppose, 
moreover, that there are special raw materials that make the 
process work and other similarly named ingredients don’t, and that 
those raw materials are not readily perceptible. 
Suppose the employees don’t sign an employment agreement, 
but they’re cautioned every month that this is a highly confidential 
process.  My point is this—you’re dealing with an area of law that 
is uniquely fact sensitive and fact specific, but it would have done 
 
 45 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980). 
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the job in Bilski.  I submit to you that they would have made their 
money many times over without legal fees, which is not 
necessarily a good thing.  Thank you. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Hold on, hold on, hold on.  Let’s just introduce you first. 
MR. GRAFF: 
Yes. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Okay, thank you very much, Roger.  Our next speaker is 
George Graff, who was a partner at Paul Hastings and was 
involved in mediation, negotiation, arbitration, licensing, 
counseling, hardcore litigation, and amicus briefs, including the 
amicus brief for the IPO—Intellectual Property Owners 
Association in Bilski. 
He certainly has done almost everything you can do in the IP 
and IT fields and also was a clerk in New York for one of our most 
famous chief judges—Chief Judge Fuld in the New York Court of 
Appeals. 
George? 
MR. GRAFF: 
Thank you.  Not to overlap, Roger, I’m going to talk about 
other alternatives, not necessarily in Bilski, but generally for 
protection of technology that people often don’t think of for that 
purpose and really for very good reasons that relate to the 
functionality issues that were discussed this morning.  But, it sort 
of breaks down in this area.  That is, protection of technology by 
copyright and trademarks, and I’ll talk about copyright first. 
First of all, copyright is a concept that was developed for non-
functional expression.  If you read the government’s brief in the 
Bilski case, they talk about the principal that what is protected by 
copyright law, and what is protected by patent law, are two 
fundamentally different things, and you don’t protect functional 
things through copyright law.46 
 
 46 Brief of Respondent at 18–19, Bilski v. Kappos, 129 S. Ct. 2735, No. 08-964 (U.S. 
Sept. 25, 2009). 
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Nevertheless, starting in 1972 or 1973—Congress appointed a 
commission that happened to be chaired by Judge Fuld, which I 
believe was called the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, but is abbreviated 
CONTU.47 
It was designed to explore how to protect new technology, 
particularly computer software.48  What kinds of intellectual 
property rights are appropriate?  There was a great deal of debate 
as to whether or not copyright law could protect computer 
software.49  After all, what could be more functional than 
something that is used, and whose sole purpose is not to entertain, 
amuse, or educate people, but to control the operation of a 
machine, which is what computer software does. 
Nevertheless, in 1978, the CONTU report recommended that 
the question be resolved, and it was a hotly debated question, by 
expressly amending that copyright law to include computer 
software programs.50  Congress responded in 1980 by doing 
precisely that.51 
So, even though, by most people’s definition, computer 
software is functional, it nevertheless is subject to protection under 
copyright law.52  That protection was extended in 1984 to 
something called mask works, which is essentially the same thing 
as computer software, except that it’s not embodied in written 
code.53  It’s embodied in the physical design of chips such as 
microprocessors and the like.54 
Then, further, in 1998, we have the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, which actually makes it actionable to disable means 
 
 47 THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED 
WORKS, FINAL REPORT ix, 1 (1978). 
 48 Id. at 1. 
 49 See id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006)).  
 52 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
 53 See id. § 902. 
 54 See id. 
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that are intended to protect software from reverse engineering.55  
And, as a compromise to the other side, it also provided defenses 
to people who operate websites.56  So you have all these 
developments where copyright law has been extended to apply to 
something functional, particularly in the area of computer 
software. 
There are a number of advantages to copyright law over patent 
rights as a means of protecting software.  Obviously, long life is 
not particularly significant to software.  Under copyright law, of 
course, when you’re talking about works for hire, we’re talking 
about a period of 95 to 125 years.57  Very few pieces of software, I 
think, will be of any value after that length of time. 
More importantly, you can have widespread publication and 
distribution of your software without losing your protection.  
Particularly in the area of object code, which is distributed en 
masse—Microsoft Windows and the like—copyright law provides 
a means of intellectual property protection to widely disseminated, 
publicly disseminated software,58 which, although it’s not subject 
to trade secret protection in the object code, has the advantage of 
being very difficult, as a practical matter, to reverse engineer.  It 
provides a good deal of protection to your software, particularly 
when it’s in object code form. 
And, of course, you don’t have any problems with establishing 
that it’s novel, that it’s useful—all of the technical requirements of 
patents.59  It’s obviously useful, but novelty and other requirements 
that we talked about this morning of patent eligibility are not 
required, as long as it’s original. 
There are no formalities.  There used to be some formalities, 
but there’s no registration required.60  There’s no marking required 
 
 55 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2850 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 35 U.S.C. 
(2006)).  
 56 See 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
 57 See id. § 302(c). 
 58 See id. § 117. 
 59 In order to be patentable, an invention must be new, useful, and non-obvious. 35 
U.S.C. §§ 101–03. 
 60 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (stating that registration is permissive). 
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any more.61  You write a program, and the minute it’s written, it’s 
protected.62  So, that’s a major advantage of copyright law.  You’re 
going through dozens of versions of different pieces of software 
and all of them are protected automatically. 
The major disadvantage of copyright law is that it only protects 
the expression and not the ideas.63  What this means is that, if 
people can figure out how your software works, they can write 
another program that does the same thing.  However, they cannot 
copy your program so they would have to develop it themselves. 
It does permit reverse engineering,64 but as I mentioned, when 
you’re talking about object code, when you’re talking about 
something that is written in machine language, it is very, very 
difficult to reverse engineer.  When you’re talking about source 
code, that’s a different story, and trade secret law becomes much 
more important to protecting source code, I should say. 
I want to move on quickly to something that people don’t 
normally think of because everybody who focuses on computer 
software recognizes that copyright law provides a major area of 
protection. 
Trademark law is something we don’t think about.  We talked 
about trademark law this morning.  How it is intended primarily to 
identify the origin of goods, so how in the world does this provide 
protection for intellectual property? 
Well, as time went on, and it’s only really in the twentieth 
century, the concept of licensing trademarks came into vogue.  
That means that you can license others to use your trademark.65  
 
 61 See id. § 405. 
 62 See id. § 102. 
 63 Id. § 102(b) (stating that “in no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea”). 
 64 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“We conclude that where disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and 
functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a 
legitimate reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted 
work, as a matter of law.”).  
 65 See 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006) (“Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be 
registered is or may be used legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to the 
benefit of the registrant or applicant for registration, and such use shall not affect the 
validity of such mark or of its registration, provided such mark is not used in such 
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So, even though the goods don’t come from you, if you have a 
certain degree of quality control over the product, you can license 
your trademark to others.66 You may make nothing that’s subject 
to that trademark and still own a trademark, and still enforce it.67 
That idea has been extended into the technology area by using 
trademarks as a way to ensure compatibility of technological 
devices to a particular standard that people have developed.  This 
is a totally new concept, at least in the mid-twentieth century, that 
really has almost nothing to do with the traditional use of 
trademark law, which is to prevent confusion of customers as to 
the origin of goods.68 
The earliest example—I just took some examples at random of 
the use of this technique—the earliest example that I could find 
dates back to 1948 when Columbia Records developed the LP 
record.69  I’m sure there were earlier ones.  I haven’t researched 
this in depth. 
 
manner as to deceive the public.  If first use of a mark by a person is controlled by the 
registrant or applicant for registration of the mark with respect to the nature and quality 
of the goods or services, such first use shall inure to the benefit of the registrant or 
applicant, as the case may be.”); Mark McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s 
Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 79–81 (2009) [hereinafter McKenna, Testing 
Modern] (“In order to distinguish legitimate uses by affiliated companies from infringing 
uses by third parties, courts gradually loosened the restrictions on licensing.  They did so 
primarily by redefining what it meant to be the source of a product: even when a mark 
owner did not actually produce the products bearing its mark, courts began to hold, it 
could still be considered the legal source of those products if it exercised sufficient 
control over their quality.” (citing Keebler Weyl Baking Co. v. J.S. Ivins’ Son, Inc., 7 F. 
Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Pa. 1934))); Mark McKenna, The Normative Foundations of 
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1910–11 (2007) [hereinafter McKenna, 
The Normative Foundations]. 
 66 See McKenna, The Normative Foundations, supra note 65, at 1910–11 (“As courts 
came to view trademarks as designators of relationships other than physical source, such 
as sponsorship or affiliation, they relaxed the traditional rule to allow licensing as long as 
the mark owner ensured a consistent level of quality in the products or services offered 
under its mark.  This change reflects the broader notion of goodwill protected under 
current law. Rather than inhering in the business of a particular producer, goodwill 
attaches to the mark and travels with it into other markets.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 67 See id.; see also McKenna, Testing Modern, supra note 65, at 80. 
 68 See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1529. 
 69 Gary Marmorstein, The Music Goes Round: The Record Company That Gave Us the 
Sound of a Century, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2007, at BW05. 
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But they developed this system, which they made themselves, 
but they also had permitted others to make, of extending the 
duration of phonograph records by turning them at a slower speed, 
and using narrowed grooves, and adopting other standards.70  But 
those were the two primary ones—slower speeds and narrower 
groove—to create a method of making phonograph records that 
allowed you to extend their life by roughly ten times what they 
were before.71 
So, it was a very, very effective, very important development, 
and they developed a trademark to describe that particular 
technology. 
Then, when Philips invented the compact cassette, which 
replaced eight track recording, and I think this happened in the 
’60s or so, when they first came out72—they’re still being used 
today to some extent—they went further; the compact cassette had 
a very specific configuration, a very specific design, a very specific 
type of hardware that could play it.73  And they had patents that 
protected it.74 
But if you wanted to make something that would comply with 
this standard technique that they had developed, you had to get a 
trademark license.  And you would identify your product with that 
trademark, that compact cassette trademark.  And that would let 
the world know that, whether it was the cassette itself or a player, 
or a part of your car radio, or whatever, if it was going to be used 
in connection with compact cassettes, it would bear that trademark.  
And that would be your indication that the device would be 
compatible. 
Another major one was the compact disc.  There’s a case that’s 
pending right now in the Federal Circuit that deals with compact 
 
 70 See Ron Penndorf, Early Development of the LP (2001), http://ronpenndorf.com/ 
journalofrecordedmusic5.html. 
 71 See id. 
 72 The compact cassette was created in 1962. DAVID MORTON, SOUND RECORDING: THE 
LIFE STORY OF A TECHNOLOGY 161 (Greenwood Publ’g Group 2004). 
 73 See id.  
 74 Wikipedia, Compact Cassette, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compact_Cassette (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
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discs.75  Now, compact discs were developed jointly by two 
different companies, Sony and Philips.76  They formed a patent 
pool and the validity of that patent pool is now in dispute because 
there’s a claim that they included a patent in the pool and 
prohibited anybody from using that patent for any other purpose, 
even though it wasn’t necessary for the patent pool.77  It’s a very 
big case right now in the Federal Circuit involving a rather old, 
well-established trademark. 
But whether that patent pool stands or falls, that trademark will 
survive.  So you will know that if you buy a CD that has that 
trademark on it, it will operate in any machine which has the same 
trademark.  Any machine that has that trademark on it will be able 
to play that compact disc.  CD recorders will be able to record and 
your CDs will be able to be played on all devices which are 
compatible with the format. 
And similar rules have been applied by a number of other 
companies.  I put the Windows thing in the middle of the slide 
because this is a trademark that is licensed by Microsoft, but only 
licensed to people who make products that Microsoft doesn’t 
make.78  So here we have no Microsoft origin at all, but it is a 
Microsoft trademark.  You can’t use that trademark unless you’ve 
qualified your product with Microsoft as being compatible with 
Windows 7.79  So that people can look at your computer or people 
can look at your piece of software, and know it will run on 
Windows 7. 
So we now have people who are using trademarks, with no 
connection at all to the fundamental historical purposes of the 
trademark—which is to identify the source and origins of good—
but solely as a way of exercising quality control over other 
 
 75 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 583 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 76 See Compact Disc Hits 25th Birthday, BBC NEWS, Aug. 17, 2007, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6950845.stm?lsm.   
 77 See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 563 F.3d 1301, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 78 See Microsoft, Windows Trademark Guidelines, http://www.microsoft.com/About/ 
Legal/EN/US/IntellectualProperty/Trademarks/Usage/Windows.aspx (last visited Mar. 
31, 2010).  
 79 See id.  
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people’s goods to make sure they comply with a particular 
standard.80 
A wonderful example of that—I don’t know how many people 
recognize that little penguin that appears in the bottom of my 
screen.  Does anybody recognize it?  Okay, so computer buffs 
certainly do. 
It’s the trademark of Linux.81  Now Linux, and we can talk 
about this a little bit more in a minute, but Linux is an operating 
system that was originally developed by an individual by the name 
of Linus Torvalds.  Mr. Torvalds personally owns the trademark, 
Linux.82 
But he didn’t write all of Linux.  Linux is a classic piece of 
open source software that has been written, and contributed to, by 
probably hundreds of individuals who have submitted various 
pieces of code to Mr. Torvalds, who examines that code and he 
decides whether it’s going to be included in Linux or not, and if it 
is, then they can use that trademark.  And if he decides not to 
include it, they can’t use the trademark.  So he uses this Linux 
trademark as a way of maintaining what Linux is, even though he 
doesn’t write Linux.  And he did this as a volunteer for many, 
many years.  He didn’t get paid for this and he established the 
standard of Linux. 
The next one I’m going to talk about is UNIX, which is 
something I had some familiarity with.  Also, there’s a decision in 
the end of your book of a case that I worked on involving UNIX.  
But this is an ongoing story that’s still in litigation about a 
computer program that was originally written in 1970.83 
Many people in this room were not around in 1970.  I was, but 
I’m going to talk a little bit about the history of UNIX because it 
illustrates both of the points that I wanted to make today about the 
use of trademark law and copyright law, and also trade secrets to 
 
 80 See, e.g., McKenna, Testing Modern, supra note 65, at 80. 
 81 See Linux Mark Institute, http://linuxmark.org/index.php (last visited Feb. 13, 
2010). 
 82 See id. 
 83 See SCO Group, Inc. v. Novell Inc., 578 F.3d 1201, 1227 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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some extent, to protect intellectual property, and in this case, a 
piece of software that dates back to 1970. 
It was the first real interactive, multi-user, multi-tasking 
operating system,84 it was a terrific development.  As I said, it is 
still being used today.  I talked about how software would never 
last for a period of a copyright, but here’s a piece of software that 
is still being used today that dates back to 1970 and it’s 2009, so 
that’s almost forty years.85 
The people who developed UNIX worked for AT&T, which at 
the time was operating under consent decree, prohibiting it from 
being in the computer business.86  So they didn’t make computers, 
and software in those days was sold with computers.87 
So the only way they decided they could make money from 
this development was through licensing.88  The first thing they did 
is they licensed it to every major university in the country that had 
a computer science program.89  So if you wanted to learn computer 
science, starting in 1970, and it’s probably still true today, you 
learned UNIX.  Because they would license their source code as if 
it were a trade secret, every student in the course had to sign an 
agreement that he would maintain it in confidentiality, and all of 
 
 84 See D.M. RITCHIE & K. THOMPSON, THE UNIX TIME-SHARING SYSTEM 1 (Ass’n for 
Computing Mach., Inc. 1974). 
 85 See id.; Alcatel-Lucent, The Creation of the UNIX Operating System, 
http://www.bell-labs.com/history/unix (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Creation 
of the UNIX Operating System]. 
 86 See Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 890–91 
(2009) (“[Unix was] constrained by the decree, AT&T could not be seen as operating in 
the computer business.”). 
 87 See id. (“[AT&T] licensed the source code for Unix for a nominal fee—it did not 
want to appear to be in the software business because of the 1956 decree.”). 
 88 See The UNIX System—History and Timeline—UNIX History, http://www.unix. 
org/what_is_unix/history_timeline/html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) [hereinafter UNIX 
History] (“Since it began to escape from AT&T’s Bell Laboratories in the early 1970’s, 
the success of the UNIX operating system has led to many different versions: recipients 
of the . . . UNIX system code all began developing their own different versions in their 
own, different, ways for use and sale.  Universities, research institutes . . . all began using 
the powerful UNIX system to develop many of the technologies which today are part of a 
UNIX system.”).  
 89 See id. 
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the trappings of a trade secret license.90  Then they would make it 
available to you and the teachers would use it as a teaching source, 
that’s how you learned how an operating system worked.91  So it 
became totally embedded in the culture of computer science as it 
was practiced in the United States because everybody came out of 
school an expert in UNIX.92 
One of the licenses they distributed was to the University of 
California at Berkeley.93  Berkeley issued its own version of 
UNIX.94  Because under AT&T’s copyright license, you not only 
got a copy of the source code, but also the right to modify it, it was 
okay to modify under the license, and therefore, they did.95 
So Berkeley issued its first, what they call, “BSD” release of 
UNIX, and AT&T agreed to license it.96  This is where it fits in 
with the theme of this whole presentation.   
 
 90 See James R. Maddox & Karl Putnam, Linux for Accountants, CPA J., Nov. 1, 1999, 
at 26 (“But as UNIX became a commercially viable product, AT&T became concerned 
with protecting its trade secrets and added a proviso to the license . . . barring its use as a 
teaching tool.”). 
 91 See id. (“During its early years Unix became popular among the academic and 
scientific community thanks to its simplicity as well as its ability to elegantly handle the 
demands of multitasking, multiuser, networked computing.  The UNIX source code, 
which was widely available at the time, was used in universities to teach [computer 
science] classes.”); Gwyn Firth Murray, Categorization of Open Source Licenses: It’s 
More Than Just Semantics, 954 PLI/Pat 63, 78 (2008) (“‘Academic’ licenses . . . 
‘promote a . . . kind of freedom, relating to the mission of an academic institution to 
promote education and scholarship.  Teachers are encouraged to publish their ideas rather 
than hide them under a cloak of secrecy.  Students are expected to take what they learn 
and apply it to their own work, creating new ideas in turn.’” (quoting LAWRENCE ROSEN, 
OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 73 
(Prentice Hall 2004))). 
 92 See Creation of the UNIX Operating System, supra note 85 (“As UNIX spread 
throughout the academic world, businesses eventually became aware of UNIX from their 
newly hired programmers who had used it in college.”). 
 93 See Unix Sys. Labs., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 790, 794 
(D.N.J. 1993).  
 94 See id. 
 95 See id.; Raju Mudhar, The Unix Quagmire, CHANNEL BUS., Mar. 26, 2001, at 1 
(noting that AT&T took a dichotomous approach to marketing UNIX because they were 
“on the one hand trying to protect it is as a trade secret and, on the other, allowing 
universities such as Berkeley to play with it”). 
 96 See Unix Sys. Labs., 832 F. Supp. at 794. 
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But, AT&T offered two different kinds of licenses; you could 
get a source code license for UNIX that allowed you access to the 
source code, the confidential source code.97  It allowed you to 
modify it, it allowed you to develop and market software based on 
UNIX.98  But there was one thing you could not do—you could not 
call it UNIX.99 
If you wanted to call it UNIX, then you had to take a different 
license: a trademark license.100  And if you took the trademark 
license, then, although you were free to modify it—it still had to 
function in a certain way.  It was subject to quality control by 
AT&T to make sure it would act like UNIX is supposed to act.101 
It would run programs that were written for UNIX so that there 
was a certain degree of overlap between all versions of UNIX.102  
And under this program, there were, and have been, and continue 
to be many versions of UNIX that are still being marketed and 
used throughout the world.103 
Now what happened was, in the early ’90s, a group of 
professors—they weren’t really professors, they were called 
investigators because they only did research, they didn’t teach—
who worked at Berkeley and who were involved in developing 
BSD, decided that they would go into business for themselves.104  
So they developed a new version of the UNIX operating system, 
but it contained no AT&T code, or supposedly contained no 
AT&T code.105 
 
 97 See id.; Marshall Kirk McKusick, Twenty Years of Berkeley Unix: From AT&T-
Owned to Freely Redistributable, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE 
REVOLUTION 31, 40 (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 1999).  
 98 See Mudhar, supra note 95, at 1. 
 99 Id. (noting that “no one was allowed to use the Unix name, so companies 
differentiated using catchy brands”). 
 100 See UNIX History, supra note 88. 
 101 See id. 
 102 See id. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See McKusick, supra note 97, at 40–41, 44. 
 105 See Unix Sys. Labs., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 790, 794 
(D.N.J. 1993). 
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It wasn’t a fully functional operating system; it was about 80% 
effective.106  They decided they would release that to the public as 
being free and open, and available to anyone.107  Then they quit 
Berkeley and went off and formed their own company,108 which 
was going to develop the other 20% that was going to be 
proprietary to them.  They were going to issue source code licenses 
for $1,000 a pop.109  Well, their business model was defeated by 
Mr. Torvalds, who went and did the same thing,110 but he gave it 
away.111   
But meanwhile the University released its incomplete version 
that it called BSD 4.4, as a free “UNIX.”112  But it wasn’t UNIX; it 
had no AT&T code.113  Well there was a dispute as to whether or 
not it contained AT&T code.114  It was eventually—I happened to 
be involved with—resolved by a settlement, where they deleted 
some code.115  They modified the other code, and AT&T permitted 
them to use other things.116 
So Berkeley was eventually, with AT&T’s blessing, able to 
come out with a free, though incomplete, version of UNIX and that 
formed the basis for Linux.117  It also forms the basis for other 
open source versions of an operating system that can’t be called 
UNIX, but function very much like UNIX.118 
 
 106 McKusick, supra note 97, at 42–43 (“Closing the gap from the Networking Release 
2 distribution to a fully functioning system did not take long.  Within six months of the 
release, Bill Jolitz had written replacements for the six missing files.”).  
 107 See id. at 40–41. 
 108 See id. at 41. 
 109 See id. 
 110 See David Bender, SCO v. IBM: The Gathering Storm, 808 PLI/Pat 75, 80–83 
(2004) (“Linux is a clone or variant of UNIX System V software and, unlike UNIX 
software, is distributed free.”); Linus Mark Institute, http://linuxmark.org/index.php (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
 111 Bender, supra note 110, at 80.  
 112 McKusick, supra note 97, at 45. 
 113 See Unix Sys. Labs., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 790, 795 
(D.N.J. 1993). 
 114 See id. at 793.  
 115 McKusick, supra note 97, at 45. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id. at 46 (discussing how BSD 4.4 set the stage for the open source movement, 
including Linux). 
 118 See Unix Sys. Labs., 832 F. Supp. at 793–94.   
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Novell is a company that used to make networking software.119  
They bought all the rights to UNIX, from AT&T.120  They decided 
they were going to split up the trademark and the code rights 
completely.  They took the trademarks and donated them to a 
foundation called X/Open, now called Open Group, and they own 
the trademark rights to UNIX.121 
They also, because they were having trouble marketing it and 
developing it themselves, sold all of the rights to their version of 
the UNIX operating system, and maybe the copyrights to UNIX, to 
a company called SCO.122 
And from 2001 to 2003, two lawsuits were brought: SCO sued 
IBM, and a number of other companies, claiming that Linux 
infringed the UNIX copyrights;123 and Open Group, which is a 
successor to X/Open, sued Apple Computer for trademark 
infringement, because Apple Computer had come out with their 
new OS X operating system, which they claimed was UNIX.124 
Apple had a license, they had a code license, but they didn’t 
have a trademark license.125  So X/Open sued them because they 
claimed that Apple didn’t have the right to use the name UNIX, 
and, in defense, Apple claimed that UNIX had become generic: 
everybody applies it to all versions of UNIX,126 so we can call it 
UNIX, even though we don’t have a license. 
What happened, ultimately, is that Apple settled.  They took a 
license from Open Group, they got certified.  So, OS X is now 
genuine UNIX. 
 
 119 Pressroom—Novell Corporate, http://www.novell.com/news/press/pressroom/ 
history.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
 120 See Michael Faulkner & Eric Goldman, SCO and the Battle over UNIX: A Clear 
Explanation, INFORMIT, June 18, 2004, http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx 
?p=175171&seqNum=2.   
 121 See Ian Fried, Apple in Court Dispute over UNIX, CNET NEWS, June 12, 2003, 
http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/hardware/0,39042972,39136146,00.htm.   
 122 See id.  
 123 See Second Amended Complaint at 50–52, SCO Group, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 
Corp., No. 03-CV-0294 (D. Utah Feb. 27, 2004). 
 124 See Fried, supra note 121. 
 125 See id.  
 126 See id. 
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What happened with the dispute between SCO and IBM?  It is 
still going forward because a dispute arose between SCO and 
Novell, which claimed they never sold the copyrights.127  The 
district court initially ruled in favor of Novell.128  But, in August of 
this year, the Tenth Circuit reversed and sent the case back.129  So, 
that case from 2003 is still pending,130 six years later, with no one 
knowing who owns the copyrights to the UNIX software.131 
From our point of view, the interesting thing about the case is 
that you have trademark protection, which is used in the UNIX 
case to define what a UNIX operating system is.  But that is totally 
separated from the copyright in the source code, which permits 
people to use UNIX as a source and develop anything they want. 
Microsoft, for example, has a license from UNIX and there is 
UNIX code in Microsoft Windows today.  So, it’s just an 
illustration about how trademark law and copyright law can be 
used effectively, at least in the source software area, to protect 
technology. 
Thank you. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Thank you, George.  Now we’re going to take a little break and 
time for questions, comments, thoughts.  And, then we’ll go on to 
Professor Sandeen. 
I have a question.  Roger? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Yes, I can think standing up. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
 
 127 See SCO Group, Inc. v. Novell Inc., 578 F.3d 1201, 1209 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 128 See SCO Group, Inc. v. Novell Inc., No. 2:04CV139DAK, 2004 WL 4737297, at 
*11 (D. Utah 2004); see also Ian Bruce, SCO v. Novell Ruling Is Good News, NOVELL 
NEWS, July 21, 2008, http://www.novell.com/prblogs/?p=488.   
 129 See SCO Group, 578 F.3d at 1227. 
130  After this Symposium was held, on March 30, 2010, a jury issued a verdict in favor 
of Novell and decided that Novell “owns the rights to the Unix operating system.” Susan 
Decker, Novell Owns Unix Copyrights, Not SCO Group, Jury Says (Update 1), BUS. WK., 
Mar. 30, 2010,  http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-30/novell-owns-unix-
copyrights-jury-says-in-defeat-for-sco-group.html. 
 131 See Tom Harvey, SCO Group’s Lawsuits Are Back on Track, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
Nov. 27, 2009, http://www.sltrib.com/technology/ci_13867657.  
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Yes.  It always seems to me that one of the problems with 
trademark protection is the scope of an injunction.  And, especially 
courts that say, “okay we’ll enjoin it for the time it would have 
taken you to independently develop it.”  Or, there seems to be a 
hostility, of at least some courts, towards granting what I would 
consider an effective injunction against an infringer.132 
Do you agree or disagree with that? 
MR. GRAFF: 
You mean trade secrets—not trademark. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
You mean trade secrets. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Yes, that’s another thing.  When I misspeak, I’m trying to 
involve you intellectually to figure out what I’m saying so you can 
actually own part of this thing and feel closer to it.  So, just be on 
the alert for that in the future. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
First of all, I think it’s a useful question because, particularly 
for those of you who are students, most of the discussions today 
have been on what I would call substantive law.  Substantive law 
really doesn’t matter very much.  Remedies matter.  So, now we’re 
asking the “so what” question. 
You’ve got a trade secret, you prevail.  What sort of relief can 
you get? 
It is accurate that, in the typical case, and there are exceptions, 
the misappropriator will be prohibited—enjoined—from doing the 
same thing for a period of time that independent development 
would have taken. 
That corresponds to the nature of the right of trade secret 
because trade secret only protects against tortious development or 
 
 132  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985); see, e.g., K-2 Ski Co. v. 
Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1974) (indicating that the maximum 
appropriate duration of both temporary and permanent injunctive relief is the period of 
time it would have taken defendant to discover trade secrets lawfully through either 
independent development or reverse engineering of plaintiff’s products). 
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development in breach of contract, but not genuine independent 
development.133  George and I could probably talk for quite a while 
about so called clean room development and the challenges there. 
Now, there are some exceptions.  And, I will tell you about a 
case in the Western District of New York, where the trade secret 
injunction was perpetual and permanent.134  That was a case about 
a French developer of a technology that was based on the 
Archimedes screw—a technology that was 2,500 years old.135 
He had perfected it to permit its use in maritime applications in 
submarines, and in silent operation of equipment in submarines.  
Silent operation is very important to avoid detection.  He licensed 
it to a major company.  I think it was Dresser-Rand.136  Some 
employees at Dresser-Rand misappropriated it,137 making a long 
story very short and because of the overwhelming proof that no 
one, including the United States Navy, which had tried for almost 
twenty years, had been able to achieve the result.138  No one had 
been able to master the Archimedes screw principle in a silent 
operation mechanism.  Because of the egregious nature of the 
misappropriation, the court granted, quite literally, a perpetual 
injunction—meaning forever.139  So, the answer is, in the ordinary 
case, you’re going to get independent development time, which the 
plaintiff has the burden to prove.  But in the exceptional case, you 
may get a “no, no, never, not that.” 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Okay, now in terms of: “I’m someone.  Should I 
misappropriate this trade secret?  What’s the downside?”  I don’t 
see that there’s a downside because, if I’m not caught, I’m using it.  
If I’m caught, all I have to do is wait until I could have done it, but 
I don’t have to pay the expense of doing it.  What actually is the 
 
 133 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 433. 
 134 See Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 905 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 135 See id. at 1216.   
 136 Id. at 1209.  
 137 Id. at 1235.  
 138 See id. at 1225.  
 139 Id. at 1235–36 (“This Court will accordingly permanently enjoin the defendant from 
not only using and disclosing the plaintiff’s trade secrets, but also from competing in the 
market for single-screw compressor technology and products.”). 
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downside to misappropriating trade secrets?  It’s rare that you get 
damages, isn’t it? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
No.  It’s common that you get damages. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
It’s common? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
The ordinary form of protection is injunction, but the additional 
remedy of damages is not only commonplace, it is often the 
principal remedy.140 
PROF. HANSEN: 
And, is it damages just as what a license would have been?  Or, 
what other damages? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Well, the theory of damages in the UTSA and in most of the 
Restatement cases is that, if you can prove misappropriation, then 
you can recover damages including the actual loss caused by 
misappropriation and unjust enrichment.141  Suppose you have a 
unique product and the misappropriation results in a competitor, 
where before there were none.  You could make a reasonable case 
for the fact that every sale made by the defendant would have been 
made by you.  And, therefore, you get into the damages area also.  
That’s usually a tough case to prove—that you would have sold it 
yourself or you would have made the profit. 
Unjust enrichment, which seems to be little understood by 
many practicing lawyers, is a burden contest.  If the plaintiff 
understands what it’s doing and the defendant doesn’t, it can be a 
disaster for the unwary defendant.  The rule for unjust enrichment 
is, “I can’t prove what my damages would have been, but I’m 
going to take your unfairly gained profits, and they’re going to go 
to me.”142  All a plaintiff has to prove is gross revenues, and the 
 
 140 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). 
 141 Id. § 3.  
 142 See id.  
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defendant has the burden of establishing legitimate deductions.143  
And, let me tell you, most defendants are fairly clueless about 
doing that.  By the way, trade secret protection is available under 
both unfair competition principles and contract law, and unjust 
enrichment is not a remedy for contract breach.144  But, keep in 
mind that wrongfully using or disclosing a trade secret in breach of 
a contract may also be a violation of the UTSA.145 
PROF. HANSEN: 
So, you would conclude that damages are an effective remedy 
in trade secret? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Yes, absolutely. 
MR. GRAFF: 
And, let me add that the statute permits both, so long as you 
don’t duplicate. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Right. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
I wanted to add that, under the UTSA, even though a judge 
might enter what seems to be, on its face, a perpetual injunction, 
you have the opportunity to go back to the court later and say that 
the trade secret was subsequently disclosed, and, therefore, to have 
the injunction rescinded.146 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Or, independently developed in the ordinary case. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
You could disclose it, couldn’t you? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
 
 143 See id. § 3 cmt.  
 144 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (1981).  
 145 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 433; see, e.g., Roton Barrier, Inc. v. 
Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v. Rucker, 
971 P.2d 936, 942–48 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1999).  
 146 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 433. 
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No, it was disclosed by a third party. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
It was disclosed by a third party. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
But you could take care of that, by just— 
MR. ROGER MILGRIM: 
That doesn’t permit you to either alter the injunction or to get 
relief. 
MR. SHARON SANDEEN: 
And, that was one of the things that the UTSA added, which 
the Restatement did not recognize. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Sir, you had a question? 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
Yes. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
And, please just give your name and affiliation. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Before you do, could we just finish one part to the answer to 
this question, would you mind?  Your question, really, in a sense, 
leads into a topic that will come up later in our panel.  Because, 
what you’re saying is, the concern is that someone will use your 
trade secret in a way that you can’t detect, and, therefore, 
effectively, you won’t have a remedy because you won’t bring a 
cause of action.  That is the great dilemma when choosing between 
patents and trade secrets, for example, for processes.  How are you 
going to prove that a third party is using your process? 
So, putting that into the decisional equation: do you want to 
keep it secret and minimize the risk?  Or, do you want to comply 
with the Patent Act, disclose the best, most insufficient way to 
enable one to practice the invention,147 and then hope that you’ll be 
able to discover the wrongdoer? 
 
 147 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).  
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There are lots of things that may escape detection.  But let me 
tell you what happens.  You usually work with people.  People are 
very unreliable.  They leave an employment sometimes with hard 
feelings.  They trudge off to a competitor, and what you thought 
was a perfect secret—that no one would know your skull-
drudgery—becomes known to the owner of the intellectual 
property within a matter of a few months.  It happens a lot. 
MR. GRAFF: 
Let me ask on damages also.  Because you’re dealing in state 
courts and misappropriation is inherently willful, the statute 
permits treble damages and attorneys’ fees as well,148 so that, there 
is significant damage exposure.  Those of you who read about the 
recent SMIC case, where the plaintiff prevailed on the merits, and 
they settled the case for $200 million, that’s not an insignificant 
sum.149 
PROF. HANSEN: 
No, I don’t think that is insignificant. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Sorry, we didn’t mean to interrupt your question. 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
That’s okay.  I wanted to go back to— 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Name? 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
Steve Hoffberg of Hoffberg & Associates.  Going back to 
Bilski, I believe the District Court decision was the first disclosure 
of Bilski’s patent application.150  So, I think you could say he had 
his cake and ate it too—that it was a trade secret until the District 
Court published it.  Now, with respect to the use of that, I think the 
 
 148 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4, 14 U.L.A. 433. 
 149 Posting of Zisha Elinson to Legal Pad, TSMC-SMIC Trade Secrets Case Settles for 
$200 Million, http://legalpad.typepad.com/my_weblog/2009/11/tsmcsmic-trade-secret-
case-settles-for-200-million.html (Nov. 9, 2009, 12:47 PST).  
 150 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949–50 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub 
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-
964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009).    
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method required disclosing to the various counter-parties what 
exactly the transaction was that they were entering into.  So, I 
don’t think it could be practiced while maintaining the underlying 
method as a secret. 
MR. GRAFF: 
It’s going to be disclosed if the patent is issued.  If it’s not 
limited to the United States, it’s going to be disclosed after 
eighteen months, if you file a patent application.151 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
Right, but he probably requested non-publication. 
MR. GRAFF: 
So, if the patent is ever issued, it wouldn’t be secret any more. 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
That’s true, but I don’t think that method could be practiced 
without disclosing what transaction people are entering into. 
MR. GRAFF: 
Well that’s— 
MR. MILGRIM: 
There are actually a lot of ways of not disclosing what you’re 
licensing, if it’s a trade secret.  There is a traditional form of 
licensing, in the chemical process and related areas, frequently 
called “Black Box Licensing.”  And, what that consists of is that 
the licensor doesn’t say how the technology works, but rather, how 
it will perform.  It will give you this output with this much raw 
material, this utilization of energy, this effluent blah-blah-blah, and 
it describes, almost as representations and warranties, what it will 
do.  You can either disclose or not disclose.  That technique in 
licensing is frequently used in so-called “Turnkey plant licensing.” 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
Right, but Bilski involved transferring risk from one party to 
the other.  So, it was a central person who would figure out what 
the deal was.  He would then match a buyer and a seller, basically, 
and you had to tell them what it was that they were transferring. 
 
 151 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b).   
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MR. GRAFF: 
In hedging transactions, if you ever work with hedge funds or 
people like that, you’ll find that they have all kinds of techniques 
to conceal what they’re doing—they have to.  They work through 
different brokers.  They use small transactions through many 
different brokers so that you can’t really tell what they’re doing.  
They use anonymous names for one transaction and different—
there’s lots of ways they can maintain secrecy in these kinds of 
things. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Just as in chemical processing, by way of analogy, it is 
common, where a raw material is a critical ingredient that the 
process will work with a raw material supplied by supplier A, but 
not by B, C or D.  The critical raw material is commonly sent to a 
third party.  It’s relabeled, it’s disguised, and it ultimately comes 
back.  That’s used in foods too, and beverages.  There are a lot of 
ways that people can avoid your knowing so easily, and that’s what 
they do. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
I think we’re going to have to cut it off now.  Thanks, that was 
an interesting interchange.  Is there anyone else with questions on 
these issues? 
I have one final thing, before we go on.  What is the role—first 
of all, what is the role of the UTSA?  Does it create any 
uniformity?  And, to what extent are courts really common law 
even though there’s this guiding, or maybe even enacted statute?  
And, are there any states that are more protective or less protective 
of trade secrets than others? 
In two sentences. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
I think we might have a difference of opinion on that.  Mr. 
Milgrim and I might have a difference of opinion on that. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Well fine, good. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
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Well, let me put it this way; the UTSA has, not in all adopted 
versions, but it has a specific provision to the effect that: “The 
decisions of sister states shall be accorded respect, for the purpose 
of achieving uniformity.”152  Because trade secret law is so fact-
intensive, it is the facts that relate to the recognition or non-
recognition of a trade secret that are critical.153  That really isn’t so 
much a focus of law, as advocacy.  Having said that, I would say 
that the most important state under the UTSA—the law of the most 
important state is California.154  California is overwhelmingly the 
most significant commercial and economic state in the union.  It 
represents about 13% or more of gross domestic product,155 and a 
lot of trade secret law emanates from California.156  It’s by and 
large quite protective of trade secret owners.157 
In its abysmal decision last year in Arthur Andersen,158 the 
Supreme Court of California managed to interpret a statute, 
California Business and Professions Code 16600, without 
adequately or deeply dealing with its pertinent provisions.159  But, 
putting that aside, aside from its poor performance with restrictive 
covenants where it arguably underanalyzes and perhaps misreads 
its own statute, California law, and the UTSA, it has been 
reasonably good.  The most difficult thing in a trade secret case is 
 
 152 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8, 14 U.L.A. 433 (“This [Act] shall be applied and 
construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the 
subject of this [Act] among states enacting it.”).  
 153 See CDI Energy Servs., Inc. v. W. River Pumps, Inc., 567 F.3d 398, 402 (8th Cir. 
2009) (stating that in some cases, but not in this one, the information at issue may be 
considered a trade secret); see also Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court, 
33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 908 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the burden of proof to 
determine whether something is a trade secret varies case-by-case). 
 154 See infra notes 155–57 and accompanying text. 
 155 Gross State Product (2010), http://www.statemaster.com/red/pie/eco_gdp-gross-
state-product-current-dollars (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).  California contributes 13.2% of 
the total Gross Domestic Product, by far the largest proportion of any state in the union. 
Id. 
 156 See Karl F. Jorda, Federalizing Trade Secret Law: A Cause Whose Time Has Come, 
GERMESHAUSEN CENTER NEWSL. (Franklin Pierce Law Ctr., Concord, N.H.), 
Summer/Fall 2008, at 11, 13, available at http://www.piercelaw.edu/assets/pdf/ 
germeshausen-newsletter-08-sf-editor.pdf (stating that most federal trade secret cases 
come from Northern California). 
 157 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c(b) (West 2009). 
 158 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008). 
 159 See generally id. at 298–99 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
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early on, and that is identifying the trade secret with 
particularity.160  California has a unique statute: California Code of 
Civil Procedure 2019.1,161 I think. 
MR. GRAFF: 
No, they’ve changed the number. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
They changed the number, they have an “a” or something, but 
it’s in 2019.  If you get that far, you’re there.  And there’s been 
decades of litigation of, “how much is enough?”  That is a tough 
one because protective orders are a ducky thing, and we all know 
that all attorneys are ethical and will never disclose your trade 
secret—until they do.162  So, everybody’s reluctant to reveal their 
trade secrets in a trade secret litigation.163  And, that’s one of the 
difficulties, in pragmatic terms. 
MR.. HUGH HANSEN: 
Sharon, were you saying that you disagree on something? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
I think the issue of how uniform is trade secret law, based on 
the UTSA, depends on how you look at that issue.  Is it an issue of 
application, which I think Mr. Milgrim is talking about.  Or, is it an 
issue of— 
PROF. HANSEN: 
I think you can call him Roger. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
 
 160 Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 907–08 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“‘Reasonable particularity’ . . . does not mean that the party 
alleging misappropriation has to define every minute detail of its claimed trade secret at 
the outset of the litigation. . . .  Rather, it means that the plaintiff must make some 
showing that is reasonable . . . .  The degree of ‘particularity’ that is ‘reasonable’ will 
differ, depending on the alleged trade secrets at issue in each case.”).  
 161 CAL. CIV. PROC. § 2019.210 (West 2010). 
 162 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151, 
153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that plaintiff’s complaint alleged defendant attorneys 
unlawfully disclosed secret information).  
 163 See Darin W. Snyder & David S. Almeling, The Identification Issue in Trade Secret 
Litigation, TRADE SECRET BLOG, Aug. 26, 2008, http://www.tradesecretsblog.info/ 
2008/09/the_identification_issue_in_tr.html. 
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Roger.  Or, is it— 
MR. MILGRIM: 
You can call me anything you want, really. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Or, is it an issue of the wording of the statute?  Certainly, in the 
UTSA—it’s been adopted in 45 of the 50 states,164 there are some 
differences in the language.  For instance, in California, “readily 
ascertainable” was put—the burden, basically, was shifted on that 
issue in the way they set up the statute.165 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Well, the California legislature deleted that phraseology from 
the statute in the form that California adopted.166  If you read the 
statutory history, which I’ve done on a few occasions, they did it 
because they thought the presence of that phraseology would make 
it easier to attack a trade secret.167  That may or may not have been 
the case, but it was not intended to weaken trade secret law.  It was 
intended to strengthen it. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Right.  But, it has the effect of basically shifting the burden on 
that particular issue.  On the issue of the discovery of trade 
secrets—I’m a California lawyer, by the way, and I’ve practiced 
law in California for over fifteen years.  I was on the downside of 
trade secret cases where the plaintiff refused and refused and 
refused and refused and refused to disclose any details about the 
trade secret, and it cost literally millions of dollars to litigate the 
issue. 
 
 164 See Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the . . . Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010); see also David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal 
Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 773 (2009) 
(noting that Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Texas have not adopted the 
UTSA); James P. Flynn, Whatsa UTSA? New Jersey and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
196 N.J. L.J. 72, 72 (2009), available at http://www.ebglaw.com/showarticle.aspx? 
Show=10659. 
 165 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2010). 
 166 Id. at cmt. 5. 
 167 See id. 
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So, we can debate whether the California rule is good or not, 
but they obviously drew the line more in favor of the defendant in 
those cases.  If you make a trade secret claim in California, you 
have to, at some point, not at the pleading stage, but you have to 
identify it with more particularity than just saying “my business 
information” or “my customer list.”168  The other thing I’ll say is, 
and I’m proud of this fact, California is much more solicitous of 
employees than any other state in the country.  That’s reflected in 
its laws and rulings on restrictive covenants.169 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Well, with that, why don’t we introduce Sharon formally?  
She’s currently at Hofstra out in Long Island.  How do you like it 
over there? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Great. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
How do you like Long Island? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
I like it.  I get to see the Atlantic Ocean. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Pardon me? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
I get to see the Atlantic Ocean. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Oh yes, there you go.  What do you do in Minnesota besides 
freeze?  Do you like Minnesota? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
No, I like Minnesota, it’s fun.  I go to the Guthrie a lot and 
watch basketball. 
 
 168 See Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 908 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (requiring sufficient particularity in trade secret cases while leaving 
open the question to future courts to determine what constitutes sufficient particularity). 
 169 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008) (establishing California’s 
policy against restrictive covenants in employment agreements). 
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PROF. HANSEN: 
You were 15 years in practice, I think, in California, roughly? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Right. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Then you were at Hamline University in St. Paul, Minnesota, 
in 2002.  You’ve written—I think you have a book coming out on 
trade secrets.  Isn’t that true? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Right, a casebook.170 
PROF. HANSEN: 
A casebook.  Recently, also, a property deskbook for business 
lawyers.171  What type of stuff is in that? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
It’s published by the ABA. It has eighteen chapters which are 
based on different business transactions, giving a summary of the 
IP issues that arise in different business transactions.172 
PROF. HANSEN: 
You went to Berkeley, undergraduate.  Then you left to go to 
McGeorge. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Yes. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Then you went back to Berkeley for an LLM.  What is it about 
Berkeley that particularly attracts you there? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Well, I was born in Oakland.  So, it’s like—it’s my place. 
 
 170 SHARON SANDEEN & ELIZABETH A. ROWE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE SECRET 
LAW (forthcoming West 2011). 
 171 SHARON K. SANDEEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK FOR THE BUSINESS 
LAWYER, A TRANSACTION BASED GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (ABA 2d. ed. 
2009). 
 172 Id. 
C05_PANEL_3_FINAL_05-12-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2010  4:26 PM 
916 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:875 
PROF. HANSEN: 
I think we’ve probably explored your personal life a little more 
than anyone else.  Oh no, okay, you’re in Chicago. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
I am? 
PROF. HANSEN: 
I thought you were originally.  Never? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Philadelphia. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Philadelphia?  Same thing, alright. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
It’s the East Coast versus the West Coast here. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
George, where are you based? 
MR. GRAFF: 
New York. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Where were you born? 
MR. GRAFF: 
New York City. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Just George and I, and a handful of others. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Basically, New York is the center of the universe, and we send 
out people to continue this center.  Alright.  Go ahead. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Thank you.  I just want to echo all the thanks that people gave 
to the organizers earlier.  This has been a great opportunity.  I want 
to say, sincerely, that I’m very honored to be on the panel with 
Roger Milgrim and George Graff.  When I started practicing law, 
actually twenty-four years ago next month, and I got my first trade 
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secret case, of course Milgrim on Trade Secrets173 was the source 
to go to for information, and it still is.  When I decided to change 
professions and become a law professor and I surveyed the 
landscape and said, “Gee, where should my area of scholarship 
be?,”  I decided to pick trade secret law because of that experience 
and because I thought it was an area of law that is under-explored 
“in the academy” as we say.  I want to thank the organizers for 
including a trade secret session in this symposium because it hasn’t 
been until the last few years that trade secret has, as I like to say, 
“changed from being the ugly step-sister of IP to being the 
Cinderella of IP.”174 
I want to talk about the pros and cons of multiple forms of 
protection.  I definitely agree with what was stated earlier about the 
need to look at all different forms.  In fact, and my students are 
hopefully at home studying, I always give a final, the hypothetical 
of which is: a client walks into your office with some invention, 
creativity, etc., and you have to advise them how to protect it. 
I tell my students, if you do not talk about the four disciplines 
that we learn in IP,175 in the IP survey course, then you’re not 
serving your client well.  You have to examine all four disciplines, 
so I agree with that.  As a lawyer, I try to follow my own advice.  
So, when I was wearing my lawyer hat, it was my job to consider 
all of those forms of protection.  I would add an additional form of 
protection that I think was alluded to with the reference to 
licensing: contract law and the use of contract law. 
Now, I think the general assumption may be that the greater the 
forms of protection, the better it is for the client.  But, I don’t think 
that is necessarily true because of costs and other factors.  Now, 
when I’m wearing my professor hat—and the general difference 
between a lawyer and a law professor is, of course, that lawyers are 
 
 173 See MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 1.  
 174 Sharon K. Sandeen, The Cinderella of Intellectual Property Law: Trade Secrets, in 2 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 399, 399 (Peter K. Yu ed., Praeger Perspectives 2007). 
 175 Generally, the four main areas of intellectual property law are considered to be trade 
secret law, patent law, copyright law, and trademark law. LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH 
SCOTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 4 (Semaphore Press 
2009). 
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very concerned with what the law is, and law professors are very 
concerned with what the law should be.  In looking at the issue of 
the impact of overlapping protection, I’m concerned about what is 
happening to the dissemination of knowledge and to the principle 
of free competition.  I’m also concerned, and I think most IP 
professors are concerned, about whether the asserted goals of the 
various forms of IP are actually true.  Then, with respect to state 
law disciplines, of which trade secret is one, of course, we have to 
be concerned about preemption problems, federal preemption.176 
Now, there are different functions of “functionality,” and one 
of them is to channel protection from one form of IP to another 
form of IP.177  For instance, the useful article doctrine in 
copyright178 channels protection to patent law,179 same with the 
functionality doctrine in trademark.180  But another way to look at 
the functionality doctrine is that it defines the types of things that 
should never be protected.  Or, what I should say, is not the 
functionality doctrine, but the different principles of functionality.  
For instance, the idea-expression dichotomy in copyright,181 and 
the patent doctrine that prevents the patenting of abstract ideas182 
obviously has identified ideas as things that should not be 
protectable. 
 
 176 See Scott Feldmann, Preemption Defenses in IP Litigation, ORANGE COUNTY 
LAWYER, Sept. 2008, at 26, 27, available at http://www.crowell.com/documents/ 
Preemption-in-IP-Cases_Feldmann.pdf. 
 177 See Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 873, 877–78 (2009) [hereinafter McKenna, An Alternate Approach]. 
 178 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, 
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent 
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.”). 
 179 McKenna, An Alternate Approach, supra note 177, at 873. 
 180 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e); McKenna, An Alternate Approach, supra note 177, at 876. 
 181 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 32 (2003) 
(“[C]opyright protects only the expression contained within a work and not the 
underlying plot, or theme, or insight of the work.”). 
 182 See Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874) (“An idea of itself is 
not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically useful is.”). 
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One of the ways this has been expressed is that certain 
information should be as free as the air for all to use.183  So, one of 
the things that I wanted to address today, and particularly since I 
knew there would be students and practicing lawyers, is: why 
should attorneys and their clients care about the limits that are 
placed on IP protection, including the limits that are placed on 
trade secret protection?  Now, this debate is often presented as a 
balance between the interests of the IP owner and the public with 
the public interest, I think, being valued far less than the business 
interest.  Often, this debate is expressed as a contest between IP 
protection and public access, or between private property rights 
and the public domain.  But, I think there’s another way to look at 
the debate.  And, this is certainly something that I experienced in 
my years of practice, which was: IP law has a push-me-pull-you 
quality.  Every time you give IP protection, or more IP protection, 
to one business or one business is able to acquire that, you’re 
basically reducing the ability of other companies to compete, to 
innovate, and to hire without fear of a lawsuit. 
Then, the other way to look at it—and again, this was my 
experience practicing in Sacramento—is that a lot of times this 
competition is between the big companies that can afford to 
acquire IP rights, and, more importantly, particularly when we’re 
talking about trade secrets, those who can afford to enforce their IP 
rights as opposed to the mom-and-pop store on the corner, that, 
although they might be perfectly within their rights to do what 
they’re doing, and in fact they might own IP rights, they don’t have 
the wherewithal to actually enforce them. 
 
 183  The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human 
productionsknowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and 
ideasbecome, after voluntary communication to others, free as the 
air to common use.  Upon these incorporeal productions the attribute 
of property is continued after such communication only in certain 
classes of cases where public policy has seemed to demand it.  These 
exceptions are confined to productions which, in some degree, 
involve creation, invention, or discovery.  But by no means all such 
are endowed with this attribute of property. 
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press (INS), 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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My concern is really about what I refer to—but I wasn’t the 
first one to do so—as the first principle of intellectual property 
law: free competition.184  What I’ve put up on the slide, this is 
actually the first line of the comments of section 757 of the 
Restatement (First) of Torts.185  The first line of section 757 of the 
Restatement (First) of Torts is that: “The privilege to compete with 
others . . . includes a privilege to adopt their business methods, 
ideas or processes of manufacture.  Were it otherwise, the first 
person in the field with a new process or idea would have a 
monopoly which would tend to prevent competition.”186  So, free 
competition is a rule, IP protection is the exception. 
So, how did we move from a strong principle of free 
competition to the development of more and more IP protection?  
Well, we did that, theoretically at least, by defining or attempting 
to define, a public interest that is greater than the principle of free 
competition.  In the INS v. Associated Press187 case, which for the 
students in the audience, hopefully you’ve been exposed to that 
and hopefully the lawyers in the audience as well, that’s where a 
cause of action was basically found to protect information which 
was not otherwise protected by copyright.188 
In the dissent, Justice Brandeis referred to this principle of free 
competition.189  In commenting on why we sometimes make 
exceptions to it, [he said] it’s because we think that there is a 
public policy that is greater than the principle of free 
competition.190  Now, obviously, in the case of patent law, what we 
think is more important is the idea of encouraging innovation.191  
 
 184 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989) 
(striking down a Florida statute that was found to be “eroding the general rule of free 
competition upon which the attractiveness of the federal patent bargain depends”). 
 185 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939). 
 186 Id. 
187  Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 188 Id. at 245–46 (holding that International News Service’s practice of appropriating 
for commercial use early editions of competitor Associated Press publications constituted 
unfair competition in trade). 
 189 Id. at 250–51. 
 190 Id. 
 191 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”); see ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & 
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The secondary purpose of patent law is to enhance the 
dissemination of knowledge.192  In the case of copyright law, it’s to 
promote creativity in the arts, enhance the store and dissemination 
of knowledge, and increase public access to information.193 In 
trade secret law, the principal reason for trade secret law is to 
prevent acts of unfair competition.194  I know there’s a debate 
about property versus not property and so forth.  In the 
Restatement, the Restatement’s very explicit, in that it says that 
trade secrets are not a property right.195 
When the UTSA was adopted, it says, basically: “we don’t 
have to decide whether it was a property right or not.”196  We have 
determined what the elements of the claim are, and you need to 
have both a trade secret and misappropriation.197  So, labels are not 
important, according to the UTSA. 
A secondary reason for trade secret law, and what I would say 
a more modern reason, is to encourage innovation.198  Also, 
interestingly or not, it has been noted by the U.S. Supreme Court 
that trade secret law enhances the dissemination of knowledge 
 
MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 127 
(2006) (“Patent law provides a market-driven incentive to invest in innovation, by 
allowing the inventor to appropriate the full economic rewards of her invention.”); see 
also BARTHA MARIA KNOOPERS, POPULATIONS AND GENETICS:  LEGAL AND SOCIO-
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 378–79 (2003) (“The primary purpose of patent law is to 
encourage inventors by rewarding them for their time, money, and energy and for taking 
risk.”). 
 192 KNOOPERS, supra note 191, at 379 (“A secondary purpose of patent law is to 
encourage the full and timely disclosure of the invention to the public as a way to spur 
innovation and overall public good.”). 
 193 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
151, 156 (1975) (stating that copyright protection “must ultimately serve the cause of 
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts”).  
 194 MERGES ET AL., supra note 191, at 38 (arguing that a goal of trade secret law is to 
uphold reasonable standards of commercial behavior by punishing wrongful acts). 
 195 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939) (“The suggestion that one has a 
right to exclude others from the use of trade secret because he has a right of property in 
the idea has been frequently advanced and rejected.”). 
 196 See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 443 (1985). 
 197 See id. § 1 (defining the elements required to find a trade secret). 
 198 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974) (noting that trade 
secret law can encourage innovation in areas that patent law cannot). 
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through licensing and it also prevents the inefficient use of security 
measures.199 
Trade secret law does not have a functionality doctrine per se, 
but it does have a number of limiting doctrines that serve the 
channeling function, and that recognize that not all business 
information is or should be protected. 
The channeling function of trade secret law is the result of the 
weakness of trade secret protection.  In Kewanee, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that trade secret law, as narrowly defined by 
Ohio law, is not preempted by federal patent law because, where 
patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions relatively as 
a sieve.200 
Now, one of the things I want to contribute to the discussion 
today, and to share with you, is that I’ve done extensive research 
into the historical context of both the Kewanee case and the 
UTSA.201  It’s important to understand that, in the lead-up to 
Kewanee, and in the lead-up to the UTSA, there were a series of 
Supreme Court cases, and several of them have been referred to 
today—the Brulotte202 case, the Sears-Compco203 cases, the 
Lear204 case, and so forth—that caused great consternation and fear 
among the patent bar, in particular, but with lawyers, in general, 
about whether or not state principles of unfair competition would 
be held preempted by federal law.  After the Sears-Compco cases, 
there was concern that trade secret law would be held to be 
preempted.  In fact, there was a whole effort, which I believe was 
sponsored by Congressman Lindsay, for years and years and 
 
 199 See id. at 485–87; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 
1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970) (arguing that trade secret law prevents the need for plaintiff to 
incur enormous expenses “to prevent nothing more than a school boy’s trick”). 
 200 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 490, 493. 
 201 See generally Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles 
of Intellectual Property Law to Determine the Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 301 (2008); Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade 
Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
 202 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
 203 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Stiffel Co. v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
 204 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
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years—and see, I’m old enough to know who he was—to actually 
adopt a federal law of unfair competition.  There was so much fear 
that the existing state unfair competition laws would go away 
completely, including trade secret law, that that’s what was going 
on. 
This is an important perspective, I think, because when the 
parties in the Kewanee case—which was a U.S. Supreme Court 
case that held that state trade secret law is not preempted205—when 
they were arguing that state trade secret law should not be 
preempted, they characterized state trade secret law as being very 
weak and very narrow.206  They did that on purpose.  They didn’t 
want to characterize trade secret law as being broad because the 
broader they made it, the more of a conflict there was between 
trade secret law and patent law. 
Thus, all the briefs that I read from the Kewanee case made the 
following argument—that trade secret law is so weak, so narrow, 
etc.207  The reason it’s so weak and so narrow is because, like 
copyright law,208 it does not preclude independent development.  It 
does not prohibit reverse engineering or other methods of 
“properly” acquiring information.209  That would be, for instance, 
by gift, or by purchase, or by licensing.  It cannot be used to 
convert publicly available information into secret information.  
This is something that I think a lot of lawyers don’t understand.  
You can’t make a contract to make something a trade secret.  It’s 
either a trade secret or it isn’t.  A contract won’t turn information 
into a trade secret. 
 
 205 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 474. 
 206 Id. at 489–90.  
 207 See generally Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 522 U.S. 1115 (1998) (No. 97-1038). 
 208 See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 
526–33 (2004) (discussing the independent creation defense in copyright).  
 209 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476 (“A trade secret law, however, does not offer protection 
against discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental 
disclosure, or by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known product 
and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or 
manufacture.”). 
C05_PANEL_3_FINAL_05-12-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2010  4:26 PM 
924 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:875 
Unlike patent, copyright and trademark law, trade secret 
misappropriation is not a strict liability tort.210  What I mean by 
that is that there is a knowledge element that requires you to know 
you’re misappropriating.211  As a result of the last point, trade 
secret law provides limited recourse against third parties who come 
to possess misappropriated trade secrets.212 
The trade secret eligibility or ineligibility function is the result 
of the definition of a trade secret.  According to the UTSA, there 
are three basic requirements: substantial secrecy, economic value, 
and reasonable efforts.213  This is one area where I disagree with 
Roger. 
The conventional observation is made that the UTSA 
broadened the scope of information that’s protected under trade 
secret law.214  I don’t disagree with that.  My argument is that it did 
not broaden it as much as people think. 
The reason is that my research—which consists of actually 
reading the transcripts of the NCCUSL215 hearings that led to the 
adoption of the UTSA—indicates to me that these three 
requirements were meant to limit the type of information that could 
actually qualify for trade secret protection, if and when a trade 
secret case was brought. 
My concern here is that, based on existing law and the way 
trade secrets are defined by some courts, that we’ve created a 
situation where there’s a great risk that trade secret assertions and 
trade secret litigation are used in anti-competitive ways.  I think 
it’s important, in light of that, that we might want to have a more 
nuanced and pro-competitive view of trade secret law, which 
 
 210 Robert G. Bone, Secondary Liability for Trade Secret Misappropriations: A 
Comment, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 529, 538 (2006). 
 211 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475–76. 
 212 Bone, supra note 210, at 538. 
 213 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).  
 214 Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name Is Still a Contract: Examining 
the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 129 (2005) 
[hereinafter Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name].  
 215 NCCUSL is the acronym for the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform 
State Laws, which is now also known as the “Uniform Law Commission.” The National 
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Uniform Law Commission, 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).  
C05_PANEL_3_FINAL_05-12-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2010  4:26 PM 
2010] TRADE SECRETS & OTHER AVENUES OF IP PROTECTION 925 
actually looks at whether or not the type of information that is 
sought to be protected needed that protection, and if you could 
match that protection with the asserted purposes of trade secret 
law.  In other words, I’ll give you an example.  Do companies 
really need an incentive to create a customer list?  I understand 
why they might want to protect a customer list, but I don’t 
understand where the incentive rationale comes in.  So, I would 
like to see, in order to make sure that trade secret law is not overly 
asserted and not used in an anti-competitive way, that we would 
look beyond the labels to see whether there’s pro-competitive or 
anti-competitive effects going on. 
Just referring to a quote from an article by Paul Goldstein in 
1971,  “[A] proper decision requires, then, that there be exercised 
in every case a discriminating appraisal of the federal and state law 
monopolies involved to determine whether they serve to advance 
or retard the federal mandate.”216  Along those lines, I think I’ll 
end there. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
You’ll have two more words. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Okay. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
We’re not going to be too harsh here, okay? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Well anyway, I’ll end there and wait for questions.  Thank you 
very much. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Let me just say, even though I’m the moderator, occasionally I 
do say things that aren’t moderate.  I’m immoderate, usually, when 
I’m here.  But I have to say, Sharon, we disagree on some very 
fundamental principles.  The first is that we have a history where 
the first rule is free competition and IP is the exception.  I think 
that history shows it’s exactly the opposite.  We had common law 
 
 216 Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CAL. L. REV. 
873, 886 (1971). 
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copyright, which certainly wouldn’t come up if that were the rule.  
Our first Copyright Act was maps, charts and books, including 
protecting those already in existence and all that’s factual 
information.217  So the idea that facts have to be free, and we have 
to compete, I don’t think was part of the deal at all. 
Common law copyright then, after the Copyright Act of 1790, 
existed in state court, for a while and then we fought it out.218  
Finally, the Supreme Court says “no.”219  But the fact that it could 
have existed at the same time, which it did in England,220 shows 
that there’s a strong view of this as a property right—not as some 
sort of incentive.  Because common law copyright automatically 
attached, it wasn’t whether there was an incentive or anything else. 
Then we go on to the INS case, which Sharon’s discussed of 
course.  She’s quoting Justice Brandeis, who is the dissent.  The 
majority, I think, is really—what we’re really dealing with in this 
country has been a Lockean view of effort and property and it 
should be protected.  We can find this in trademark law, copyright 
law, unfair competition law.  But there is a situation, clearly a 
situation, of reporting news, and someone was simply rewriting 
it221 so copyright didn’t apply.  So, if free competition was the 
default drive, and IP was the exception, the court wouldn’t then 
come up, for the first time, with the misappropriation doctrine.222  
It’s because effort, a Lockean view of effort, creates a property 
right at least of some kind that’s the default drive that we’ve had in 
this country all along, I think. 
Then what happens, Erie v. Tompkins223 says, “no federal 
common law.”224  So did we lose it?  No.  Rather than limit it to 
hot news, competition, and these factual distinctions, we get 
 
 217 See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 218 Edward C. Walterscheid, Understanding the Copyright Act of 1790: The Issue of 
Common Law Copyright in America and the Modern Interpretation of the Copyright 
Power, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 313, 333–35 (2006).    
 219 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 658 (1834) (noting that “there can be no common 
law”); see Walterscheid, supra note 218, at 333–35.  
 220 Walterscheid, supra note 218, at 318. 
 221 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 243–44 (1918). 
 222 Id. at 242. 
 223 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 224 Id. at 78. 
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“sweat-of-the-brow” doctrine,225 which takes that concept and puts 
it into copyright, in a very broad sense, without those limitations, 
which is really protecting effort, collection.  Then we get Feist226  
and the Feist people say, “Oh, well it’s Feist, overrule that.”  Feist, 
I don’t think, has had that effect.  And one thing, Feist wasn’t a 
“sweat-of-the-brow” case.  Feist was telephone directories. So, as 
you put in a thing, a computer did it, and it wasn’t free-riding 
because Feist was actually willing to pay for these things.227  So, it 
was a hypothetical which didn’t produce, usually, the doctrine of 
tremendous amount of effort and someone taking it for free.  But, 
in talking about preemption, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor says 
that even though this is not protected by copyright, it could be 
protected by state unfair competition law.228  So, this is a broad 
view of preemption, theoretically, certainly the Warren Court 
wanted to preempt everything.  So, I think you’re right, the cases 
in that period, Sears and Compco, Lear, were very anti-IP.  But 
that was just like the Warren Court was in many areas—an 
exception to what was going on. 
The Restatement, Sharon.  Who pays attention to the 
Restatement?  A Restatement is—what is a Restatement?  I’m 
going to spend five years doing a Restatement.  You think I’m 
going to restate?  No.  I’m going to try to put in what I think the 
law should be.  I mean, I’m not going to waste my time with 
restating.  So, Restatements are really hidden, if not explicit, policy 
preferences, which can be valuable.  That’s not saying they’re not 
valuable, but I think that Restatements are rarely a restatement.  If I 
were doing a Restatement, I certainly wouldn’t just restate. 
So, I think what we have then is a strong academic view—in 
which I think you are in the mainstream of the academic view of 
IP.  But, we also have a very real-world view, which is opposite of 
that.  The question is: when these collide, what is going to happen?  
To some extent, when, God forbid, you go on the bench, Sharon, 
 
 225 See Denise R. Polivy, Feist Applied: Imagination Protects, but Perspiration 
Persists—the Basis of Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations, 8 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 773, 775–76 (1998). 
 226 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 227 See id. at 363–64. 
 228 See id. at 354. 
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and are a judge—no, you’d be a great judge, I’m just joking.  I just 
joke sometimes like that and people take it seriously.  I mean this 
could change.  If information has to be free, it’s what I call the 
public domain.  If “culture of the public domain or cult of the 
public domain” becomes into—or, our judges, things may actually 
change.  But right now, Congress—what does Congress do? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
That’s a good question. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Congress really can do anything.  But what does it do when we 
say—okay, preemption of what Bonito Boats229 holds in a far 
Florida law.  What does Congress do?  It actually passes a national 
law that overruled that.230  It’s not like this view is accepted in 
various places.  I think it actually is the academic view.  It might 
have merit.  It might not have merit, but I don’t think it reflects 
what is actually going on.  It might be reflected more in trade 
secrets.  You have the expertise, but I think as a general rule, I 
would disagree with you the way it is patterned right now between 
protection and free competition. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
If I could respond.  There is this debate—and thank God there 
is because it makes these panels more interesting and it gives us 
something to write about and so forth and so on.  But, every case 
on functionality, whether it’s trademark or copyright or patent or 
trade secret, has sentences or paragraphs about the principle of free 
competition and how important it is.  I’m not citing it to argue that 
we shouldn’t have any IP.  What I wanted to get across, and if I 
didn’t get it across, I’ll try to do it now, is that we have IP 
principles in order to fix what we thought were imperfections in 
the market economy to provide inventors, creators, etc., incentives 
and to prevent unfair competition.  But if we go too far, then all of 
a sudden we’re creating an environment where we’ve reintroduced 
 
 229 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 144 (1989) (holding 
that a Florida statute prohibiting the use of a process for duplicating boat hulls was 
preempted by the Patent Act). 
 230 See Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006) (providing specific 
protection for boat hull designs). 
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the anti-competitiveness that we were trying to prevent.  I want to 
suggest that’s what we’ve done; we’ve gone too far.  If we start 
looking at the issues more from the point of view of another 
business that is being attacked by the IP rights of somebody else, 
or if it’s a small business— 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Who’s being attacked? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Another business.  In other words, it’s not IP versus the public 
interest.  It’s competitors—it’s the competitive environment of the 
United States that I’m concerned about and I think it’s become 
anti-competitive. 
The comment I wanted to make at the end is that I find it 
extremely ironic that at basically the same time, roughly 1970, 
people were commenting on and criticizing antitrust policy in the 
United States and saying, “hey, we shouldn’t have per se rules 
because they don’t really look at what’s actually going on in the 
marketplace.  Let’s have an equitable rule of reason.”231  We have 
substituted that situation for a series of IP—a ratcheting up of IP 
rights—in a way where, it’s a per se assumption that the benefits 
we say we’re getting from these IP regimes, we’re actually getting.  
What I’m suggesting is, we should actually require courts to see if 
that’s happening.  If you say that encouraging innovation is one of 
the reasons for trade secret protection, then when you’re the 
plaintiff, prove that you needed that incentive in order to create 
your trade secret. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
You guys are going to respond.  Let me just respond—two 
seconds.  I think the premise is wrong.  Nobody, I think, who’s 
driving IP policy thinks “it has to be, because innovation.  And if it 
doesn’t indicate innovation, you’re not going to have it.”  It’s a 
property right.  It’s a Lockean property right.  Trademark’s viewed 
in that—goodwill and trademarks.  Copyright’s viewed in that—
 
 231 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
18–19 (Basic Books, Inc. 1978).   
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sweat-of-the-brow232 is certainly an indication of that.  
Idea/expression?  Come on.  Idea/expression is a fallacy.  It’s a 
phantom.  Whenever there’s something of value there—theories, 
psychological tests, or anything else—courts protect it.  The only 
time idea/expression is used is when it’s sort of a junky thing and it 
shouldn’t be protected.  You can’t think of— almost every case 
finds a way to protect when there’s something of value.  It’s only 
used when it’s not of value.  So, if you’re right, if everything has to 
have a test of “should we protect this because otherwise we won’t 
have innovation?,” a lot of things would be different.  But, the 
reason it’s not that way is that’s not what we do.  It is true, there’s 
some language of that in Supreme Court cases, but the results 
reach something differently.  I think what we have to do is look at 
the result and look at what’s happening.  I think it’s a very strong 
thumbs down on the side of protection. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
I really wonder whether our courts are at all qualified to even 
consider the question Professor Sandeen would have them raise—a 
question they have no interest in hearing or answering. They don’t 
have the expertise. 
Unfortunately, the people that are most commonly making 
these arguments—the academic community—have even less 
expertise.  Look at the country that you live in.  We are a country 
that has benefited from innovation, more than any country on the 
globe and in the history of the human race.  That’s almost an 
unchallengeable statement.  So, while our IP laws may not be 
absolutely perfect in every respect—God knows our judicial 
system is awkward and cumbersome—it is a system in which the 
seeds of innovation have flourished remarkably.  If you look at any 
other system, there’s no comparison.  So, at least from 60,000 feet 
we can look down and say, “Gosh, it seems to have worked.” 
I want to add one other point.  The words “unfair competition,” 
used as a catch all to describe trade secret law, are a 
misapplication.  Most trade secret cases—I can’t give you an exact 
percentage, but I want to say 85% to 95% or maybe more—
 
 232 See Polivy, supra note 225, at 775. 
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actually have a lot of contractual elements.233  I’m one of those 
old-fashioned people who believes that enforcing contracts is a 
good and noble thing.  In that sense, I’ve aligned myself with the 
Romans, with the civilians, and with people everywhere else.  Why 
should we recoil from enforcing contracts?  Let me reiterate that 
most of the cases in the trade secret area, unlike patent and unlike 
copyright, in fact have contractual bases as well. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
I agree with that. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
We have time.  If George is not going to—do you want to 
respond?  Or, do we go to the audience? 
MR. MILGRIM: 
You all would like the afternoon. 
MR. GRAFF: 
I want to say one thing.  Reading the Bilski briefs, for example, 
you’ll find numerous briefs, which discuss the kind of policy 
issues that you talk about—about what is needed to encourage 
innovation and what is not needed to encourage innovation.234  
They are all over the lot.  From a lawyer’s point of view, in 
determining what the law ought to be, it is impossible to make that 
determination.  It’s simply not something that courts can do.  I can 
tell you that the diagnostics industry, for example, and the people 
who invest the millions of dollars in developing new diagnostic 
techniques say, “We need patent protection if we’re going to make 
this kind of investment to get any kind of return from it.  If we 
don’t get that protection, we’re not going to make the investment.”  
That’s a legitimate argument, but you can argue on the other side.  
 
 233 See, e.g., Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1974).  
 234 See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of Internet Retailers in Support of Respondent, In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 2007-1130) (contending that a finding of 
patent rights in business methods will support innovation); Brief of the Intellectual 
Property Section of the Nevada State Bar, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (No. 2007-1130) (same).  But see Brief of Amicus Curiae Timothy 
F. McDonough, Ph.D., Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (U.S. July 22, 2009) (suggesting that 
an expansion of patent rights would not support innovation); Brief Amicus Curiae of Red 
Hat, Inc., Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (No. 2007-1130) (same). 
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Well, do you really want to prevent doctors from reaching a 
conclusion based upon observed facts because of a patent?  So, you 
have all these policy issues.  These are not judicial issues.  These 
are legislative issues to me.  The law is where it is, and I don’t see 
that it’s a productive debate to determine in every individual case 
whether or not protecting this particular patent or trade secret or 
anything else, is justified in order to protect investment, or is 
simply something that isn’t.  I mean, we have all the troll cases.  
You have arguments on both sides, but it’s not the way judges can 
deal with the law, I don’t think. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Let me just add, I’m on Sharon’s side—I think—on the patent 
side, a little bit.  I do think that is an area where you really do have 
to take incentives in a case.  I’m against business method patents 
because I think everyone’s going to do it, and I think it’s much 
more problematic to grant the protection.  So, I think that is an area 
of the law, which should have that sort of a guide.  But, I’m 
arguing the premise that the rest of the law has been driven by this 
and I don’t think it has.  Unfortunately, patents, to some degree 
haven’t been driven by it, and I would agree with you that perhaps 
they should be driven by it more.  Do we go to the audience?  
Sharon? 
MR. SHARON SANDEEN: 
Well, quickly, on the contract issue that Roger brought up, I 
agree with that, but it is part of the element of misappropriation.  In 
other words, you misappropriate a trade secret when you breach 
some duty.235  The duty may arise from either an express or an 
implied contract;236 so I agree with that. 
The other observation I will make is that you can’t confuse a 
breach of contract claim, and the remedies for a breach of contract 
claim, with a trade secret claim.237  So, if you have a contract to 
protect information, and the information is not a trade secret, your 
remedies are contract remedies.  They’re not trade secret remedies. 
 
 235 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
 236 86 C.J.S. Torts § 62 (2009). 
 237 See Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name, supra note 214, at 145–48.  
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MR. MILGRIM: 
May I just add one point?  A thought occurred to me, Sharon, 
where we actually have a mini-laboratory that tests some of the 
propositions we’re all interested in.  In Italy, for many years, I 
don’t know if it’s still true, but for many decades for reasons of 
public policy, patent protection was denied to pharmaceutical 
products.238  Italy, at the time that law was passed, was not either a 
major manufacturer or developer.  But what’s interesting is that in 
the thirty or forty years after the patent law in Italy was modified 
so that you could now protect a new drug, or a similar 
pharmaceutical product, there was limited development in Italy of 
a pharmaceutical product.239  So again, you’re tampering with a 
system when you say, “let’s do away with protection for advances 
in development.”  That can have very material, direct 
consequences.  I don’t suggest that’s a perfect test. Unfortunately, 
we can’t have alternative universes and measure them.  But really, 
I work with businesses all the time.  I’ve been a director of large 
companies.  These forms of protection are what drive us, we don’t 
do it case-by-case.  We decide a budget at the beginning of a 
year—we’re going to spend $42 million.  We do that because of a 
framework that we have confidence in, to protect the output.  We 
won’t do it otherwise. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Right.  Just to be clear, I’m not advocating for getting rid of 
any form of IP.  What I’m advocating is not to keep expanding to a 
point where it’s used as an anti-competitive tool. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
We have time for a couple of minutes for your basic audience, 
final audience questions.  Thoughts? 
MR. MOSCHOLEAS 
Hi, my name is Dimitrious Moscholeas.  I respectfully disagree 
with what you said.  Although, of course, I’m not even a duly 
 
 238 See Taiwo A. Oriola, Against the Plague: Exemption of Pharmaceutical Patent 
Rights as a Biosecurity Strategy, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 287, 337.  
 239 MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 219 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2008). 
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experienced litigator, but all these policy considerations are part of 
the judicial process.  Just that, it depends on which policy you are 
referring to.  Of course, they might not always be intellectually 
honest and admit the policy that drove their decisions, but I’m sure 
that’s what interests them.  Two days ago, Chief Judge Michel was 
here, in the same auditorium, and basically what he alluded to was 
that they do know the doctrine, and what they need to see more in 
lawyers’ briefs, is to see the practical impact that a decision might 
or might not have.  He actually said that they might not actually 
acknowledge it in their decision—it was the policy that drove them 
and that’s what interested them the most.  But, that’s what he 
alluded to—to be less doctrinal and think about the policy 
implications and the practical impacts in the real world.  Of course, 
he didn’t specify which policy.  Like, it could either be a policy 
favoring more the public domain people, or a more Lockean view.  
That’s a different issue, but I think it is part of the judicial process, 
even if it’s acknowledged or not, explicitly or impliedly.  Thank 
you. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Anyone? 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
Hi, Steve Hoffberg.  Sharon—your proposal to test, on a case-
by-case basis,240 the incentive, on one hand may have the effect of 
excluding protection for certain things that might otherwise be 
protectable.  But, the other side of that is, you’re going to create 
protection for things whose only incentive is that there was some 
protection so I’m going to go get it.  How does that promote 
competition, if all you’re doing is creating a form of protection 
based on the protection? 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
To be clear about what I was saying, if you look at the 
definition of a trade secret in the Restatement (First) of Torts, 
which Roger referred to earlier, it’s a list of factors.241  Hugh’s 
comment about Restatements was that perhaps the people who 
 
 240 See supra text accompanying note 216. 
 241 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
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wrote the Restatement in 1939 were projecting their own point, but 
I think what they were intending was it to be, in an odd way, a 
flexible definition so that the courts could make an equitable 
determination whether the information was deserving of 
protection.  What happened was, that isn’t the way the courts 
applied those factors and so there was a lot of inconsistency.  And, 
when it came around to the UTSA, the drafters said—and they 
were mainly patent attorneys—they said: “Trade secret law is too 
confusing.  We don’t know what a trade secret is.  We have to be 
clearer about that.”  So, they tried to be clearer about what it is.  
But I think the idea that there’s some information that’s deserving 
of protection and some that isn’t, was in the original—in the early 
cases.242  So I’m just suggesting— 
MR. HOFFBERG: 
What I was addressing is the fact that you want to look, not 
going forward, as to what the framework is, but on a 
retrospective—was there incentive in a given case, as a factor in, 
whether there should have been protection.  What I’m saying is 
that there are two sides to that.  One is that you’re going to deny 
protection of certain things that would otherwise be protectable, 
but you’re also going to incentivize people to seek protection for 
things that might not otherwise have been protectable. 
PROF. SANDEEN: 
Another way to look at this, and I didn’t have time to go into it 
and I’m continuing my research, but, one of the speakers this 
morning referred to the concept of “commercial value,” which I 
think is a well-known term among patent lawyers.  The patent 
lawyers who drafted the UTSA obviously used that term with that 
meaning in mind so that whatever the meaning was in 1970 of the 
term, they put that in the UTSA.  In my opinion, they included it in 
order to limit what type of information would be protected.243  That 
particular prong of trade secret law has not been fully examined.  
But, that would be another place or another way, I think, that we 
could prevent the over-assertion of trade secret rights, which is 
what I’m mainly concerned about. 
 
 242 See, e.g., Heyman v. AR. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 590 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 243 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). 
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PROF. HANSEN: 
Okay. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Just one moment, please.  Because the UTSA reporters, in fact, 
told us what they were intending to do, in their notes that are 
published, this is not a background report.  They said that the 
purpose of the UTSA was to codify “the basic principles of 
common law trade secret protection, preserving its essential 
distinctions from patent law.”244  That’s what they said.  So, either 
they were misstating, or we’re looking for an intent that is not an 
expressed one. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
Thank you, that was a good final addition.  I’m glad that you 
persisted. 
MR. MILGRIM: 
Me too. 
PROF. HANSEN: 
I think there is now going to be a coda.  Is that what you’d call 
it?  The end.  But, I want to thank this panel for a very interesting 
presentation. 
PROF. KATYAL: 
Hi, everyone.  I’m Professor Sonia Katyal, and I’m going to 
give just a few closing remarks for today.  As I was sitting through 
the panels today, I kept coming back to a central and very obvious 
question that we’ve all been struggling with, which is the question 
about what functionality actually comprises.  I think that we’ve 
been exploring this question of functionality through a whole 
variety of different lenses, and we’ve come to some very surprising 
and very insightful results.  We’ve explored the question of 
functionality through the lenses of patent law and the theme of 
novelty.  We’ve explored the question of functionality through the 
lens of copyright law, through the doctrines of originality and 
asthetic functionality, and the limitations and possibilities of both.  
 
 244 Id. at prefatory note. 
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We’ve also explored the question of functionality through the 
world of trademark and trade dress. 
As the last panel explored, we have also been discussing this 
question intensely through the domain of trade secret law, raising 
the question of whether or not there are powerful alternatives to 
patent law available in protecting against misappropriation. 
Underlying these subject matter areas, we’ve also explored the 
underlying theme, perhaps indirectly, of where the appropriate 
institutional locus should be for making these relevant 
determinations on functionality.  Should it be the courts?  Should it 
be Congress, and enlarging the role of legislative interpretation, 
and statutory redrafting?  Or, perhaps, would we prefer deferring to 
the realm of administrative decision making instead, either at the 
state or at the federal level?  Lastly, is the issue of unfair 
competition—as I think our last panel raised—is the issue of unfair 
competition really an issue that is appropriate for intellectual 
property law to decide at all? 
Finally, underneath all of these different questions that we’ve 
been exploring, either directly or indirectly, is the powerful theme 
of proprietary boundaries, and its effect on innovation.  I think 
perhaps this is the most powerful underlying theme that we have 
explored today in the context of functionality.  I think what’s so 
interesting about this issue, however, especially regarding this 
conference, is that, I think most conferences deal with the question 
of innovation and property through the lens of copyright.  I think 
what’s particularly unique and special about this conference is how 
we have explored this question, either directly or indirectly, 
through a whole variety of other subject areas, and allowed them to 
take center stage—so, patent, trade dress, trade secret, all of these 
other areas and how they impact the role of innovation and the 
growth of technology. 
I want to end today’s conference by reflecting on some of the 
unanswered questions that we’ve been lightly treading on today, 
and to just really ask, as we close, us to all reflect upon some of the 
overall implications that I think the question of functionality has 
offered us. 
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So, I think, one of the questions that I’m struggling with at the 
end of these very insightful panels is whether or not we should 
start thinking about patent law and wanting it to look a little bit 
more like copyright law, in terms of the preservation of 
innovation?  Or, as a related question, should we want trademark 
law and trade dress law to look a little bit more like the way 
copyright law has dealt with questions of originality and 
functionality? 
I guess there’s a larger question.  This is the question that I 
want to leave you with.  Should intellectual property law exist as a 
body of common principles that unite every subject-matter area?  
Or, should it be a disparate series of tests instead?  To reframe the 
question: is the answer greater convergence in the areas of IP?  Or, 
is the answer greater divergence instead?  In exploring these 
questions, one might argue that the function of functionality is to 
both capture and also illustrate, profoundly, the kind of richness 
and complexity of these questions, and ask ourselves whether or 
not the ideal standard should be an objective, fixed one, or whether 
it should be a more malleable, subjective standard? 
I want to end by asking these questions, but also suggest that 
the issue of functionality really can’t be divorced from questions 
about protecting competition—as we just saw in our last panel, 
questions of innovation, particularly given the fact that we live in 
an age, as the second panel emphasized, an age of creative design.  
But, we also live in an age of design within reach.  That also 
presents us with some interesting questions that will continue to 
unfold.  I think Bilski remains a key part of how these questions are 
going to be answered in the future. 
In closing, I want to thank all of you for coming today.  I want 
to extend a very special and huge thank-you to the amazing staff 
and the Board of the IPLJ for putting together this event.  I also 
want to really thank our incredibly distinguished panels of 
speakers and moderators today.  It’s really been an incredible 
group, and I would say that this has been a really wonderful and 
powerful way to mark our twentieth year anniversary of the IPLJ.  
I want to thank all of you for coming, and I hope to see many of 
you at Fordham again soon.  So, thank you. 
 
